Kindaika (近代化)

Japan and the Restoration of 1868

Mariel Raizza G. Argonza

(G3507840T)

February 2006

Kindaika: Japan and the Restoration of 1868

Introduction

Kindaika (近代化) in the Japanese language means “modernization”. Japan transformed itself from an agrarian-supported feudal society—secluded by the Tokugawa Shogunate for more than 250 years—to one of the most industrialized nations in the late 19th century and thereafter.

Modernization theory recognizes that global development proceeds when advanced industrial nations and technology help poor nations advance1. Initial models suggest that a nation’s rank in the global hierarchy was strongly predisposed to factors such as poor geography (e.g. terrain, poor soil), bad climate, lack of economic infrastructure for trade, etc2 .

Others argue for the presence of corruption and “warlords” that wasted money and resources instead of it for business3. Some put the blame on traditional customs and traditions which slowed down the progress of poor nations because of financing “nonproductive” religious activities.4

If we compare Japan before the Meiji Restoration, it appears that it carries all of the above “impending” factors for modernization. To begin with, Japan is mostly a terrain and lacks natural resources. Trade was mostly intra-national5 for a long time and the chōnin6 did not possess much influence, perhaps not until the latter days of the Tokugawa regime. The country was long dominated by the daimyō7 who reigned over a han8 under the Shogun’s9 name. Furthermore, the Japanese people in these times—even up to now—were very tradition and value-oriented.

Of course, today’s Japan is a far-cry in terms of technology and advancement from what it was during and after the restoration. Despite having not-for-modernization features in the 1860s, Japan grew and developed rapidly.

In this paper, I will be discussing Japan’s encounter with modernization after the bakufu10. I chose this as my starting point because this is when Japan truly opened its borders to the world. I argue that even though the role of foreign intervention in the advancement of a developing county is necessary, it is not always sufficient; the interplay of the existing circumstances which the country finds itself even before the foreign intervention constitute a big role in the modernization process.

I present three factors which eased 1868 Japan into modernization: the internal decay of the feudal society, foreign intervention, and the presence of a legitimate polity that will guide the modernization transition.

Internal Decay of the Tokugawa

A common rendition of the Tokugawa Shogunate before 1868 was that of an almost stagnant and economically primitive era. There is the idea that the appearance of foreign forces solely caused its downfall11 which some authors argue against:

“In the 17th, 18th and 19th centuries, rapid economic growth had produced an advanced economy capable of ready transformation into an entirely new political and social order…By the middle of the 19th century, the antiquated political system and absurd political and social philosophy of the Tokugawa were more than 200 years out of date. The simple concept of the division of classes into rulers, warriors and commoners had little relation to Japan of the 19th century with its teeming cities, rich merchants, restless samurai and discontent peasantry.”12

The internal events that sparked the restoration are a series of tangled causes and effects. Barrington asserts that the (Tokugawa enforced) peace and (display of) luxury undermined the regime’s power base13. By peace, he means that the Tokugawa permitted a commercial way of life to emerge not only in the towns but also in the countryside where commercial influences eroded much of the feudal edifice”14.

As for the luxury side, he was pointing, though not explicitly to the sankin kōtai15 system.16. I assume that the heavy expense that the daimyō incurred while under this system was the “luxurious display”. However, his interpretation is not that important when compared to how it affected and inevitably united the daimyō17, samurai18, chōnin19, and perhaps even the hyakushō20 classes.

To cover his expenses, the daimyō either sold the excess rice and products21 by using the services of the chōnin22. The chōnin, on the other hand, relied on the daimyō and samurai for political protection.

The symbiotic relationship between warrior and merchant, the country’s isolation, and the long political influence of the warrior, made the merchant as financers instead of reformers23 unlike their counterparts in Europe24. Moreover, this mutual dependency slowly destroyed the rigid class barriers upon which the stability of the Tokugawa relies25. Class inter-marriages and warriors becoming merchants and vice-versa were very common even though there was an edict against it26. The Shogunante painfully kept a blind eye because the aristocracy was heavily reliant on the merchant27. Although the Shōgunate had the capacity to eliminate this, doing so28 would kill the goose that lays the golden egg29.

There was also discontentment among the samurai (which probably explains why many reformers came from the samurai class). The status of the samurai badly deteriorated in the Tokugawa era:

“A good income of rice was for a samurai merely the material basis for the life of a warrior. Under the enforced peace of the Tokugawa, the warrior had no obviously important social function to perform….the wealth of merchants were beginning to compete with the martial virtues. The old ethic was being undermined…To make matters even more difficult, the warriors were prohibited in engaging in any form of commerce. Though many have evaded the prohibition in order to make ends meet, whatever wealth they gained in this way could scarcely have contributed to their feeling of security as samurai.”30

Stipend cuts, the loss of function as warriors, and the inroads of commerce severely affected the loyalty of the samurai31. Many severed their ties and instead became rōnin, or wandering masterless swordsman whom were more like “fighters for hire”. The Chōshuu han—a big player in the restoration process—became a refuge for the rōnin32. In the end, it was the weakening of the Tokugawa’s power base precipitated by the rise of commerce, the loosening social classes, and the dissatisfaction of the samurai which caused the internal decay of the Tokugawa regime.

The Black Ships33 and Foreign Intervention

Commodore Matthew Perry is credited for the opening of Japan in 1854 through the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Kanagawa34 which forced Japan to open its ports for international commerce and trade35. However, even with the treaty in act, various hans—especially Chōshuu with its strong sense of sonnō jōi36—strongly opposed in opening up their own domains.

Chōshuu was very determined to “expel the barbarians” that in 1863, along its ports at the Shimonoseki Strait, it fired on American, French, and Dutch ships37. In return, American and French warships destroyed Chōshuu’s ports in an incident called the “Shimonoseki Affair”. This was followed by a naval expedition against Chōshuu a year later38 which made Chōshuu leaders respect the power of the West and its modern weapons. They also realized that an alliance with the foreigners was necessary in overthrowing the Shogunate.

The same idea surfaced in another han, the Satsuma—Chōshuu’s greatest rival in the Imperial Court39—after facing defeat from Britain40. Impressed by its military power, Satsuma’s daimyō soon developed close ties with Britain—a relationship which would later play an important role in the restoration of the Emperor41.

The Shogunate’s powerlessness became more obvious after its incapacity in punishing unruly clans42 that previously attacked the foreigners as well as its failure to secure payment for the damages made on the foreigners’ nationals and properties43. At this point, the movement to return the Emperor into power rapidly increased44.

Sakamoto Ryōma, a samurai from the Toza han conceived and worked out the idea of creating a coalition between the Chōshuu and Satsuma—an idea deemed impossible at first because the two clans simply hated each other. After agreeing to certain provisions and reconciliation, the Sat-Chō alliance was secretly drawn up in Kyōto on the 7th of July 186645. With the British military backing up the alliance and the death of the 14th Shogun Tokugawa Iemochi46, the restoration was only two years away.

From the previous section, I gave evidence that the Shogunate’s power deteriorated internally even before Commodore Perry or the other foreign powers came in. Thus, when the foreigners finally “intervened”, the Shogunate was already tipping off the balance and movement to destroy it was underway. The coincidence of these factors eventually led to its inevitable collapse.

The Isshin-shishi47 and the Return of the Tennōsei48

We finally come to the last factor in our modernization formula—the presence of a legitimate polity that will guide the modernization transition.

After the Shogun stepped down, Japan was restored to a tennōsei with Meiji Mutsushito as the new tennō49. A new (non-representative) government was founded50 by the Isshin-shishi in the name of the Emperor. A closer look will make it clear that the majority of the Isshin-shisi belonged to the samurai class. The fact that they ushered in the restoration does not make it enough that they were able to take power. There was something more—in Japanese factional politics, possession of the emperor was nine tenths of the game”51.

And indeed, having the tennō who is nothing less than a symbol of Japanese national consciousness in your clique meant that you have the entire Japanese society’s support52─at least during that time. Even under the Tokugawa rule, the tennō served as the legitimizing agent to the Shogun53.

And this was even more so for the anti-Tokugawa forces. Even with Britain’s assistance, without the tennō as their legitimizing factor for the restoration, the support from the other classes would have been lackluster to nil—they would rather be under the Tokugawa than end up in a civil war or feudal anarchy54 if the restoration failed.

The authority that the tennō carried with him proved to be more useful after the restoration. The new Meiji government’s decisions became synonymous with imperial decisions.55 In turn:

“…not only did it Meiji constitution institutionalize sovereignty in the person of a divine emperor, it gave a cloak of credibility to the myths and dogmas of sanctification which had historically supported the Japanese monarch”56.

The Meiji years had its own defects57, of course but the bottom line is that Japan experienced rapid advancement and modernization in this era which it would probably not have otherwise. Another important thing to note is that the restoration created a lot of changes economically but it did little to change the status quo with the political leaders mostly from the feudal aristocracy58.

With necessary assistance from advanced Western countries59, it developed communication and transportation systems which were very beneficial for domestic and international trade. Basic provisions such as electricity, water, education60 and health also improved61. And not to mention, its military prowess developed to become one of the most advanced during WWI and WWII. Let me end this section with the following words from Hall:

“…it is hard to conceive that there was a reasonable alternative to the kind of samurai leadership which arose at the end of the Tokugawa period and the kind of ‘enlightened absolutism’ which they established by 1871.”62

Conclusion

Japan’s path to modernization consisted of the interplay of three interdependent factors: internal decay of the Tokugawa, foreign intervention, and the presence of a legitimate polity that guided the modernization process.

The literature showed us that the Tokugawa was facing a power crisis during its middle reign precipitated by the loosening social classes, the rise of commerce, and a general dissatisfaction among the samurai and peasant classes. This is to say that the Shogunate was already on it way to collapse even before the foreigners came63.

The events after that and the changing attitudes towards the foreigners from the point of hans such as Chōshuu and Satsuma were critical for rallying the restoration of the tennōsei system. Without the tennō’s legitimizing figure, however, the reformers would probably have had a hard time gaining support. Moreover, the Isshin-shishi would have failed in establishing the Meiji government if it were not, again for the tennō’s symbolic role of sovereignty and authority.

Having done that, we can now come up with a hypothesis for modernization that encompasses these factors64. The internal decay of the Shogunate and the great political skill65 legitimized by the tennō are internal factors66 while foreign intervention is an external factor67. Being interdependent as they are, I therefore choose to combine them. My hypothesis proceeds as thus: the likelihood of a developing country to modernize depends upon its internal status before foreign intervention or assistance.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books

Barrington, M. (1966), “Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Modern World”, Beacon Press, Boston.

Hall, J.W. (), “A Monarch for Modern Japan”, in Robert Ward (ed.), Political Development in Modern Japan.

Norman, H.E. (1940), “The Emergence of Japan as a Modern State”, Institute of Pacific Relations, New York.

Sakai, R. (1964), “The Satsuma-Ryukyu Trade and the Tokugawa Satsuma Policy”, Journal of Asian Studies, Vol.23 (3), pp. 391-403.

Sakakibara, E. (2003), “Structural Reform in Japan: Breaking the Iron Triangle”, Brookings Institution Press, Washington, DC.

Thompson, W. and Hickey, J. (1999), “Society in Focus: An Introduction to Sociology”, Allyn and Bacon, Boston, Massachusetts.

Website (supplementary)

Tokugawa Shogunate, (2006) About Inc., available at visited 11 February 2006

1 Thompson, W. and Hickey, J. (1999), “Society in Focus: An Introduction to Sociology”, Allyn and Bacon, Boston, Massachusetts.

2 Ibid.

3 Ibid.

4 Ibid.

5 From 1600 onwards, international trade (mostly with Europe) was controlled by the Tokugawa. After the edict of the Seclusion laws or sakōku in 1635, only inbound ships from China and Holland were permitted in government designated ports (Sakai, R. (1964), “The Satsuma-Ryukyu Trade and the Tokugawa Satsuma Policy”, Journal of Asian Studies, Vol.23 (3), pp. 391-403).

6 Merchant class

7 Lords, nobles. There were 194 of them in 1614 which rose to 266 before the 1868 Restoration (Barrington, M. (1966), “Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Modern World”, Beacon Press, Boston).

8 Domain, fief

9 Generalissimo

10 Baku, which means “tent” is an abbreviation of bakufu which means “military government” ), started with Tokugawa Ieyasu’s rule (1603) until the last Shogun, Tokugawa Yoshinobu (1868).

11 Norman, H.E. (1940), “The Emergence of Japan as a Modern State”, Institute of Pacific Relations, New York.

12 Ibid.

13 Barrington, M. (1966), “Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Modern World”, Beacon Press, Boston

14 Ibid.

15 The Tokugawa “hostage” system wherein the daimyō was compelled to spend one-half of his time in Edo and another half in his own han. The daimyō’s family, slaves, prisoners, etc. would all stay in Edo while the daimyō was in his han.

16 I would not literally consider this as a luxurious display. It is actually a control employed by the Shōgun as can be shown in footnote number 12. However, such a system did require the daimyō to spend a huge sum of money (household maintenance in Edo and in the han, travel, etc.)

17 Lords, nobles

18 Warrior, feudal aristocracy

19 Merchant

20 Peasant

21 produced by the hyakushō in his han

22 The daimyō and the samurai relied on the chōnin for credit, loans, and other services such as converting rice into cash.

23 Barrington, M. (1966), “Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Modern World”, Beacon Press, Boston

24 During the revolution, the big merchants of Osaka and Kyōto supported the anti-Tokugawa clans. The Meiji Revolution was not about the uprising of the business class which destroyed feudalism (Norman, H.E. (1940), “The Emergence of Japan as a Modern State”, Institute of Pacific Relations, New York).

25 Barrington, M. (1966), “Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Modern World”, Beacon Press, Boston

26 Ibid.

27 Money, loans, credit, etc.

28 Confiscation of property, arrest, fines, etc.

29 A large portion of the wealth of the chōnin came from hyakushō in the form of taxes. The hyakushō’s contribution is also important because they supported the whole Tokugawa system with their taxes, labor as agriculturists, and soldiers. However, there was also widespread discontentment among the peasants because of the Tokugawa Shogunate’s continuous disregard for them. However, there was no peasant uprising because of the relatively strong peasant base and traditional feudal ties that existed especially outside Edo and Osaka where the Shogun’s influence on commerce was evident (Barrington, M. (1966), “Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Modern World”, Beacon Press, Boston).

30 Barrington, M. (1966), “Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Modern World”, Beacon Press, Boston

31 Ibid.

32 As we shall see later on, the restoration was largely carried out by the samurai class.

33 The Japanese called Perry’s fleet kurofune (black ships) because of their color and the black smoke produced by the steam ships (Sakakibara, E. (2003), “Structural Reform in Japan: Breaking the Iron Triangle”, Brookings Institution Press, Washington, DC).

34 Sakakibara, E. (2003), “Structural Reform in Japan: Breaking the Iron Triangle”, Brookings Institution Press, Washington, DC.

35 Ibid.

36 Chōshuu’s anti-foreign policy which literally means, “Revere the Emperor, expel the Barbarians” (Westerners being the “barbarians”). In December 1862, the Chōshuu dominated the Kyōto Court and got the Shogunate to agree to the expulsion of the “barbarians”. The Shogun was forced to set a date June 25, 1863 before which all foreigners would be expelled, although he knew that it was impossible. So, by this time the Chōshuu had placed the Shogunate in an impossible position. The Shogunate was caught between the pressure from the Kyoto Court and the superior military power of the West. It became ineffective. It was unable to make any step of policy, as it merely waited (Norman, H.E. (1940), “The Emergence of Japan as a Modern State”, Institute of Pacific Relations, New York)

37Norman, H.E. (1940), “The Emergence of Japan as a Modern State”, Institute of Pacific Relations, New York.

38 At the end of May 1864, foreign ministers renewed their demands for the opening of the Shimonoseki Straits, threatening to take action themselves if Edo failed to do so. When Edo failed to give a reply, the ministers organised a joint naval expedition against Chōshuu. In September 1864, 17 foreign warships destroyed all the Chōshuu forts on the Shimonoseki Straits and forced Chōshuu to agree to the opening of the Straits. The bakufu had to pay a war indemnity which was abolished after the bakufu agreed in June 1866 to a new commercial treaty which reduced import duties to 5 and removed nearly all the restrictions on foreign made (Norman, H.E. (1940), “The Emergence of Japan as a Modern State”, Institute of Pacific Relations, New York).

39 In 1862 Satsuma proposed itself as mediator between Kyōto and Edo with the following agenda: a) to secure more Shogunate respect for the imperial court; b) to secure the release from confinement of Keiki (son of the Lord Mito and defeated candidate for the Shogunship, was pro-emperor and kept in confinement since 1859); c) the appointment of Keiki as the Great Elder and guardian of the new Shogun. Satsuma won imperial support for this proposal and with the court's censor it proceeded to suppress the Extreme Pro-Imperial samurais from Satsuma and other hans. Then Satsuma presented the demands to Edo. Yielding to pressure, the Shogunate accepted the demands and made Keiki the Great Elder and Guardian of the Shogun, with Lord of Hizen (Matsudaira Keiki) had strong imperial leanings as a form believer in national unity. Under his influence the whole Tokugawa hostage system (Sankin-kōtai) was abandoned and the attendance of the daimyos 100 days every 3 years. These startling measures made obvious a change that had already occurred. The Shogunate no longer could exercise effective control over the hans (Norman, H.E. (1940), “The Emergence of Japan as a Modern State”, Institute of Pacific Relations, New York).

40 In Satsuma the feeling of expelling the barbarians was also strong and would be illustrated by the Richardson Affair on September 14, 1862. This incident involved 4 Englishmen who were riding in the city of Yokohama and encountered the procession of Shimazu Hisamitsu. Richardson was killed by an enraged samurai who felt that the foreigner had not shown proper respect for their great lord. The British reaction was quick and by threats of naval power Britain forced the Shogunate to pay an indemnity of L100,000. She also demanded an indemnity from Satsuma and punishment for the murderer. On August 15, 1863, the Satsuma forts at Kagoshima fired on the 7 British ships which gathered there to force their demands. The British proceeded to destroy much of Kagoshima and to sink most of the Japanese ships (Norman, H.E. (1940), “The Emergence of Japan as a Modern State”, Institute of Pacific Relations, New York).

41 Norman, H.E. (1940), “The Emergence of Japan as a Modern State”, Institute of Pacific Relations, New York

42 Chōshuu, Satsuma, Toza, etc.

43 Norman, H.E. (1940), “The Emergence of Japan as a Modern State”, Institute of Pacific Relations, New York.

44 Ibid.

45 Ibid.

46 His successor was Tokugawa Yoshinobu, the last Shogun. He planned to further the nation’s progress through opening the country fully to international trade (Norman, H.E. (1940), “The Emergence of Japan as a Modern State”, Institute of Pacific Relations, New York). Interestingly, France gave its support to the new Shōgun before and during the revolution. This, one can amusingly note became a “silent” war between France and Britain.

47 The Meiji reformers composed mostly of the Sat-Chō and other hans’ samurais.

48 Monarchy/Imperialism

49 Monarch/Emperor

50 The Meiji government is credited to Okubō Toshimichi (Satsuma), Saigō Takamori (Satsuma), and Katsura Kogōro (Chōshuu). These three men are dubbed as the Isshin-sanketsu. Saigō and Katsura died before 1877 (suicide and natural death respectively) while Okubō was assassinated in 1878.

51 Hall, J.W. “A Monarch for Modern Japan”, in Robert Ward (ed.), Political Development in Modern Japan, pp. 11-64.

52 This stems from the historic nature of the tennō as a direct descendant of the gods as well as the strong Shinto and Confucian ideas prevalent in that time. Therefore, the tennō is a transcendental being in the principles of Shinto, and at the same time the embodiment of the “Mandate of Heaven” (the Emperor was always revered as someone who would look after the good of the people; after the restoration, the Ishhin government accepted this role in the name of the Emperor) in the Confucian sense (Hall, J.W. “A Monarch for Modern Japan”, in Robert Ward (ed.), Political Development in Modern Japan, pp. 11-64.).

53The Shogun, by himself does not carry any sense of sovereignty (Hall, J.W. “A Monarch for Modern Japan”, in Robert Ward (ed.), Political Development in Modern Japan, pp. 11-64).

54 Barrington, M. (1966), “Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Modern World”, Beacon Press, Boston

Ibid.

55 The Emperor was de jure included in the party but de facto, did not have a voice in it (Barrington, M. (1966), “Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Modern World”, Beacon Press, Boston).

56 Barrington, M. (1966), “Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Modern World”, Beacon Press, Boston

Ibid.

57 Which I will not be discussing because it lies outside this paper’s scope.

58 We can attribute this to Japan’s long and strong history of peasant traditional and feudal aristocracy ties wherein a “healthy” agriculturist society is the one which the peasants are subordinate to the aristocracy (Barrington, M. (1966), “Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Modern World”, Beacon Press, Boston).

59 Britain was of course at the forefront of this.

60 Japanese scholars, politicians, and military went abroad to study about Western science and other fields.

61 This was very necessary for the new government to be accomplished because the people expect them to “look after them”. Some of the uprisings during the Meiji were due to rising expectations which was relatively deprived later.

62 Hall, J.W. “A Monarch for Modern Japan”, in Robert Ward (ed.), Political Development in Modern Japan, pp. 11-64.

63 To open the country to international trade as well as military support for the restoration.

64 This can be used in another if not a less or more similar setting later on.

65 Barrington, M. (1966), “Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Modern World”, Beacon Press, Boston

66 Notice that in the Japanese case, both these factors also had a number of precursors within them. To be able to apply this hypothesis to other contexts, we need to consider more or less similar situations although this will obviously vary. The main point here however, is that the factors should be internal (within the country) in locus.

67 Foreign intervention will always be an external factor because this is carried out by the foreign country itself. Even in cases where a (developing) country asks for assistance, the decision will always remain in the foreign country.