The Modernization Take-off:

A Comparison of Japan and China

Mariel Raizza G. Argonza

(G3507840T)

April 2006

The Modernization Take-off: A Comparison of Japan and China

Introduction

Modernization theory suggests that global development proceeds when advanced industrial nations and their technology intervene1 to help poor nations advance2. However, foreign intervention—no matter how necessary—may not always be sufficient to catapult a developing country into modernization. The existing and endogenous circumstances which the country3 finds itself even before the foreign intervention indirectly contribute4 to the modernization process5. In this paper, I include the following factors as endogenous6: a political power group7, source of legitimacy8, local immersion/acceptance of foreign ideas and technology, and internal decay of the existing system9.

My hypothesis for this paper will thus be: foreign intervention, through its interplay with a country’s endogenous variables, will result to the modernization of that country. To test this hypothesis, I have chosen post-Meiji Japan and late-Qing China as my cases10. Except for land size and population, these two countries share similarities: an agrarian-state, ruled by a central and hierarchical social structure11, a Confucian value system, and strong family/clan connections. Rostow termed such setting12 a “traditional society”13. Both countries experienced foreign intervention and pressure—especially from Britain—before completely opening their shores for international trade as well as technological importation from the West. Of the two, China had an earlier and longer exposure to the Westerners. However, by the 1890s—just two decades after the Meiji Restoration—Japan significantly improved in her economic, political, and social dimensions14 while China’s own seemed to have been left wanting15 until later in 1912. I will show that this time lag in China and Japan’s modernization cases relied on the intercourse between the foreign actors’ intervention and the endogenous factors mentioned above.

The Presence of a Political Power Group

Rostow mentions that take-off from a traditional society happen when “old blocks and resistances to steady growth are finally overcome”16. Also, he includes the “emergence of a political power group prepared to regard the modernization of the economy as a serious, high-order political business”17. In Japan, the fall of the Tokugawa Shogunate and the restoration of the Emperor Meiji18 (“enlightenment”) in 1868 were engineered by the famous “Isshin Sanketsu”19 from the Sat-Cho Alliance. Things might have ended up differently if these two equally powerful clans did not find a common ground20—they were, to begin with the biggest of rivals in the Kyoto Court21. After the restoration, government control and power was in the hands of the Reformists who mostly came from the aristocrat-warrior classes22—and perhaps it was for the better. The new Isshin government proved capable by effectively laying out economic and institutional reforms23 for the country24.

In contrast, with the fall of the Qing dynasty in 1912, there remained in the center of the Chinese state, a vacuum with no able leaders to fill the gap in25. Instead, there were, as it has always been, factions and rival groups with contending interests and ideologies26. This was the same problem they faced when dealing with foreigners for the first time.27 The long-standing fragmented situation hampered previous attempts or what could be previous attempts to modernize even before the Qing came to a close.

Source of Legitimacy

One of the reasons why the Isshin revolutionists gained a wide support base from the Japanese was the backing of the Emperor—in Japanese factional politics, possession of the emperor was nine tenths of the game 28. This made actions and decisions29 of the new government blurred if not equivalent to Imperial ones30. With the Japanese populace respecting the “Imperial’s” actions, the government was able to effectively implement their policies and reforms31 that favored the modernization process.

The late Qing reform-programs32 of 1903-1911 were unfortunately really late, and at the time of their execution, the Qing has already lost much of its luster to the people. The Manchu Court was getting more and more inefficient with the lack of capable leaders, disappointment in the provincial gentry33, increased taxes, and disputes over the failed railway plans34. Moreover, the numerous defeats35 of the Manchu army against foreign powers were, in the eyes of a people that held strong anti-foreign sentiments for so long-a-time, a weakness and incompetence in the government’s part. These resulted in the erosion of the Qing’s legitimacy for any reform-programs to work.

Western Immersion

“Expel the barbarian” was a common theme to both Japan and China since the Western world knocked on their doors. However, the difference lay in how long such a feeling existed. As early as 1865, leading hans (Choshuu and Satsuma) already recognized and respected36 the technological superiority of the West. Acquisition of such knowledge and technology meant invaluable resource for the success of the Restoration and onwards. The adaptation of Western knowledge and technology rose further during the Meiji era. The Meiji government sent various study missions to Europe and America37 and continued to welcome foreign investments while doing so.

In the same period, China was advocating its Self-strengthening Movement. Unlike the openness that the Meiji government and the Japanese people displayed, the movement sought to introduce Western techniques but leaving its traditional structure in tact38. Indeed, Japan’s decisiveness in responding towards the face of the Western Imperialist challenge was matched by contemporaneous Qing’s determination to reinstate an orthodox neo-Confucian ruling ideology to an empire at the brink of collapse by the devastating 1860s Taiping rebellion39. It took until 1896 for the Western impact40 to significantly stir the fundamental traditional political, economic and social structure of China after a shocking defeat by an empowered Japanese military41. One can speculate that had the leaders of the Self-strengthening movement create a more open structure, chances include almost China enjoying same level of development that Japan was experiencing at that time.

Decay of the Existing System

The weakening of the Tokugawa’s power base precipitated by the rise of commerce, the loosening social classes42, and the dissatisfaction of the samurai43and peasants44caused the internal decay of the Tokugawaregime45. When the foreign powers came in, the Tokugawa was already starting to fall apart. The Reformers willingly welcomed Britain’s assistance in the Restoration and that added extra pressure which completely tore the Shogunate down. Perhaps if the Tokugawa regime was still strong and the loyalty of the people remained, the foreign intrusion might have yielded different results. Modernization might have slowly if not at all happened.

The Qing Dynasty managed to stay until 1912, just a few years after the Self-strengthening movement was initiated. What was thought to be the “last resort” channel for rallying their dynastic forces through a mix of political, military, and economic reform46 ended up in the overthrow of the Qing instead47. Like the Tokugawa regime, the Qing suffered from the internal decay of its own system. Not only was there a lack of viable leadership in the Manchus, the Emperors were also inefficient and so was the bureaucracy brought about by rampant corruption and the sale of posts. Socio-economic factors such as an increase population but no complementary increase in jobs caused dissatisfaction and hardship among the poor. Rivalry among the military officers and soldiers48 resulted in the lack of cooperation in case an emergency occurred. The Western exposure that became more widespread in the latter years of the Qing fueled the nationalist sentiments and resulted in the end of the Dynasty.

Conclusion

The Japanese and Chinese paths to modernization were both assisted by foreign intervention. Though the endogenous factors49 that interacted with the foreign intervention were dealt with differently, it still led to the eventual modernization of the two countries even though there was a time-lag between Japan and China’s modernization take-off. For the Japanese and Chinese cases, my hypothesis is consistent.

With the powerbase of the Tokugawa already crumbling before the intrusion of foreign powers such as Britain, its downfall was highly inevitable should Britain side with the Reformists—which it did. Not only did the Isshin Revolutionists succeed in their Restoration plans, they were also composed of young and capable leaders. Gaining the legitimacy of the Isshin government’s actions from the Emperor, they eased the country in modernization50. The assimilation of Western technology and knowledge was also actively and responsively done.

In China, the Qing’s powerbase also waned over time after numerous defeats from foreign nations. However, it was able to stay in power longer unlike the Tokugawa era Japanese; the Chinese at that time had strong anti-foreign sentiments which impeded the assimilation of Western technology and knowledge. This slowed down the build-up of nationalistic ideas in the populace. It was not until the early 1900s that Chinese educated abroad formed strong nationalist attitudes and realized how “technologically backward” their nation was. However, after the fall of the Qing, China lacked the leadership of Meiji Japan that would be very helpful in the facilitation of the transition to modernization which could explain why the modernization process took-off later in the 1930s.

1 Intervention can take many forms (e.g. colonization, treaties and protocols, financial aid, etc.). All or some of these may take place simultaneously.

2 Thompson, W., & Hickey, J., (1999), “Society in Focus: An Introduction to Sociology”, Allyn and Bacon, Boston, Massachusetts.

3 I am referring to undeveloped or developed countries.

4 As intervening variables

5 Argonza, M.R., (2006), “Kindaika: Japan and the Restoration of 1868”, Unpublished (February).

6 Hence, the intervening variables

7 In-charge of planning the guiding the modernization transition

8 Or authority for the modernization transition

9 Or the ruling party in the country’s government

10 Both fall in the same time-frame as well.

11 Pre-Meiji Japan was ruled by the Tokugawa Shogun (the Shogunate has lasted around 250 years) in the name of the Emperor; in China, it was the (Manchu) Emperor or a retainer.

12 In terms of its economic dimensions, others include: preconditions for take-off, the take-off, the drive to maturity, and the age of high-mass consumption.

13 Rostow, W.W., (1960), “Chapter 2: The Five Stages-of-Growth – A Summary”, Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

14 A popular example of Japan’s power and technological advancement at that time was the Sino-Japanese War (1894-95) wherein Japan was the victor and claimed Korea as its protectorate (see Spence, J.D., (1991) “The Search for Modern China”, 2nd Ed., W.W. Norton and Company, New York, London. pp 222-223). Also, Japan’s advancements in the manufacturing and production sector such as raw silk (see Ma, D., (2004), “Why Japan, Not China, Was the First to Develop in East Asia: Lessons from Sericulture”, available at ?iddoi:10.1086/380947 accessed on 31 March 2006. The Japanese educational system was also improved with the introduction of natural and social sciences in the curriculum. Politically, Japan has instituted the Diet with an existing Imperial system.

15 This is not to say that China was completely stagnant. Its trading ports such as Shanghai became lucrative for local and foreign merchants. Turn-out of other ports (as per the Treaty of Nanjing), however were vastly disappointing. Adaptation of Western knowledge and technology was still seen as the “barbarian’s way of life”.

16 Rostow, W.W., (1960), “Chapter 2: The Five Stages-of-Growth – A Summary”, Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

17 Ibid.

18 18-year old Mutsushito

19 Saigo Takamori (Satsuma-han), Katsura Kogoro (Choshuu-han), and Okubo Toshimichi (Satsuma-han).

20 That is, overthrowing the Tokugawa and the unification as well as modernization of Japan by following Western models.

21 Satsuma at first was leaning towards the Shogun’s side with their kobugattai (the Union of the Court and Shogunate) while Choshuu pushed for their sonno-joi (Revere the Emperor, Expel the Barbarians) in favor of the Emperor.

22 The Merchant and peasant classes did not have a huge part in the new government. They either served as financers or recruits during the revolution. One can say this is the result of the rigid class structure enforced by the Tokugawa Shogunate wherein the aristocrat-warrior classes were entirely dominant.

23 Spence, J.D., (1991) “The Search for Modern China”, 2nd Ed., W.W. Norton and Company, New York, London. pp 220.

24 As can be seen in the improvements in Japanese education, medicine, communication, transportation, military affairs, manufacturing, etc.

25 Li Hung-chang died in 1902, Chang Chih-tung in 1909. Both the Empress Dowager and the Emperor Kuang-hsu died in 1908. Prince Chun, father and regent for the new emperor, was incompetent and ignorant. He dismissed Yuan Shih-k'ai from office, thus removing and angering the only powerful man who could have saved the dynasty (Spence, J.D., (1991) “The Search for Modern China”, 2nd Ed., W.W. Norton and Company, New York, London. pp 141).

26 Ibid. Spence adds that what followed after this was a “period of civil war and intellectual disorder that…for the Chinese people was even harsher than the period after the fall of the Ming 268 years before”.

27 Conservative court eunuchs and other advisers strongly influenced China’s foreign policy.

28 This stems from the historic nature of the tenno as a direct descendant of the gods as well as the strong Shinto and Confucian ideas prevalent in that time. Therefore, the tenno is a transcendental being in the principles of Shinto, and at the same time the embodiment of the “Mandate of Heaven” (the Emperor was always revered as someone who would look after the good of the people; after the restoration, the Ishhingovernment accepted this role in the name of the Emperor) in the Confucian sense (Hall, J.W. “A Monarch for Modern Japan”, in Robert Ward (ed.), Political Development in Modern Japan, pp. 11-64).

29 New policies and reforms in both the domestic and international levels

30 In actuality, however, the Emperor had no formal powers in the new government.

31 Occasional disagreement happened, of course. This is more so with the abolishment of the social classes. A good example would be the prohibition of public sword-bearing by former samurai. Some former samurai could not live with this and often resulted to small-scale uprisings. Perhaps the most documented and most serious of these former samurai uprisings was the Seinan war.

32 The Late-Qing reform was marked by a mixture of policies largely imitating policies of the Meiji reform and other Western countries. The Late-Qing reform in the areas of legal system, modern education, the role of government and so on (Ma, D., (2001), “Republican Chinese in an East Asia Persepective: A New Interpretation”, available at accessed on 30 March 2006.

33 According to the time-table of the late Ch'ing constitutional movement, a National Assembly was opened in Peking in 1910. In this way, an opportunity was given to the provincial gentry leaders from all over China to come together (in Peking) and demand more power from the Central government. They were dissatisfied with the slow progress of the constitutional rule: i. They expected a parliament immediately, not in 1917 as the Manchu government promised; ii. They discovered that the Manchu court regarded them only as powerless advisers in the National Assembly; iii. They were angry to learn that the newly formed cabinet consisted mostly of Manchu nobles. In protest, many of these provincial gentry’ leaders formed a Society of Friends of the Constitution (Hsien-yu hui) in mid-1911. The purpose was to put more pressure on the government. The Manchu court, however, ignored the association. Bitterly disappointed, the gentry leaders returned to their provinces. It was they who decided to declare independence from Peking after the Wuhan uprising in October “The Chinese Revolution of 1911”, available at accessed on 30 March 2006.

34 As part of the late Ch'ing reform program, many of the gentry leaders and merchants in southern provinces had earlier raised money for building railways leading to Peking. The Manchu court, however, disliked the idea, believing that the plan would only further weaken central control over the provinces. Aiming at establishing a centralized railway system, Peking therefore tried to obtain a foreign loan to buy up all provincial railway rights. The terms of such a railway nationalization plan seemed rather unfair and disadvantageous to the provincial investors. In mid-1911, the government even ordered the provincial railway companies to disband. Consequently, the provinces broke into angry protest .

35 Examples are the Opium War against Britain, the Sino-Japanese War, the Sino-Russo War, in which all China lost and had to pay back indemnities as well as concede to treaties that more or less relieved China’s hold on her foreign, economic, and other areas of policy.

36 Satsuma made close-ties with the British while Choshuu sent some of their men abroad for study missions. British would later help in financing the Revolution against the Tokugawa. Interestingly, France came to the aid of the Tokugawa but was still defeated in the end.

37 Example, The Iwakura mission that sent Meiji ministers on a 2-year study tour of Europe and America in 1871–73 enlightened Japanese sericulturalists as well. Following the official Iwakura mission to Italy was a group of Japanese sericultural experts headed by Nagaatsu Sasaki, who visited Northern Italy in 1873 which at that time, was at the forefront of sericulture industry (Ma, D., (2004), “Why Japan, Not China was the First to Develop in East Asia: Lessons from Sericulture 1850 – 1937”, University of Chicago Press available at ?iddoi:10.1086/380947 accessed on 30 March 2006).

38 The Qing bureaucrats did recognize the superiority of Western military technology and, under the so-called Self-Strengthening Movement (1860–94), attempted to modernize the Chinese military through a series of either government-financed or government-controlled Western style industrial enterprises. The attitude of the Self-Strengthening Movement toward private initiatives in the modern sector ranged from indifference to hostility and displayed little interest in supplying modern public goods; in most cases, this movement was even opposed to private efforts to build public infrastructure such as railroads and inland steam shipping. In comparison, Meiji’s sell-off of its limited number of government enterprises in the 1880s gave a powerful signal that the private sector was the mainstay of Japan’s industrialization. The government concentrated on building crucial social and physical infrastructures such as a legal system, public education, research and technological diffusion, a modern monetary and banking system, modern transportation, and modern communication (Ma, D., (2004), “Why Japan, Not China was the First to Develop in East Asia: Lessons from Sericulture 1850 – 1937”, University of Chicago Press available at ?iddoi:10.1086/380947 accessed on 30 March 2006).

39 Ma, D., (2004), “Why Japan, Not China was the First to Develop in East Asia: Lessons from Sericulture 1850 – 1937”, University of Chicago Press, available at ?iddoi:10.1086/380947 accessed on 30 March 2006

40 Britain imposed a treaty in 1842 that fundamentally altered the structure of Qing relations with foreign powers. It ended the long cycle of history in which China’s rulers had imposed effective controls over all foreign resident on their soil. (Spence, J.D., (1991) “The Search for Modern China”, 2nd Ed., W.W. Norton and Company, New York, London. pp 139).

41 Spence, J.D., (1991) “The Search for Modern China”, 2nd Ed., W.W. Norton and Company, New York, London. pp 139.

42 Intermarriages (between merchant-warrior classes) were illegal, but the Shogunate had to keep a blind eye over the matter because the merchant classes provided a huge part of the Tokugawa’s finances.

43 The enforced peace under the Tokugawa made the role of the warrior near useless and stipend cuts were everywhere. Also, the edict against the warrior class participating in any form of commerce gave the samurai no extra source of stipend or cash.

44 High taxes were imposed on the peasants but their livelihood did not fare any better. Thus, under a Confucian belief system, there was no longer a “Mandate of Heaven” which meant taking care of the people by the ruler.

45Argonza, M.R., (2006), “Kindaika: Japan and the Restoration of 1868”, Unpublished (February).

46 Spence, J.D., (1991) “The Search for Modern China”, 2nd Ed., W.W. Norton and Company, New York, London. pp 222-223.

47 (a) Educational reform - The students sent by the Ch'ing government to study abroad turned out to be either intellectuals dissatisfied with the corrupt Manchu rule or revolutionaries working to overthrow the dynasty; (b). Political reform - Constitutional practice gave opportunities to the local provincial gentry to establish independent power against the dynasty. The worsening tendency of political decentralization opened the way for the provinces declaring independence from Peking in 1911-12; (c). Military reform - Military reform led to the establishment of regional military forces practically independent of Peking's control. In the end, because these military forces did not support the dynasty, the Manchu Emperor was forced to abdicate in 1912 “The Chinese Revolution of 1911”, available at . accessed on 30 March 2006.

48 Just like in Japan, the soldiers were prohibited to engage in commerce making them dependent on the state’s stipends.

49 Presence of a political power group that facilitated the modernization transition, the source of legitimacy for the modernization transition, immersion/acceptance of foreign intervention and technology, and the internal decay of the current system.

50 Clearly, what set the Japanese induced innovation in the modern era apart from that of the premodern is not its direction of technical bias but, rather, its sharply accelerated pace of technical progress due to the availability of the newly supplied public or social capital (thanks to the Isshin government’s reforms) to create economy-wide externalities (Ma, D., (2004), “Why Japan, Not China, Was the First to Develop in East Asia: Lessons from Sericulture”, available at ?iddoi:10.1086/380947 accessed on 31 March 2006).