THE LAST DAYS OF THE MARCOS REGIME AND THE

POLITICAL TRANSITION OF THE PHILIPPINES

INTRODUCTION

According to Richard Snyder, there are three crucial relationships that characterize the structural dynamics of sultanistic regimes: the ruler’s relationship to state institutions; the ruler’s relationship to domestic social elites; and the relationship of domestic actors (that is, hard-liners, soft-liners, moderates, and maximalists) to foreign powers.1

Furthermore, his analysis on sultanistic regimes like Zaire, Haiti, Nicaragua, Iran, Cuba, Romania and the Philippines shows whether and how actors took these structural factors as created opportunities for strategic maneuvering.

Recognizing that many factors contribute to the downfall of a sultanistic regime, this paper will only concentrate on one of Snyder’s structural factors—the relationship of domestic actors to foreign powers. Seen in this light, the focus will be on how the US influenced both the downfall of the Marcos regime and the democratization in the Philippines through the so-called “People Power Revolution”.

The first part of the paper will discuss the complex relationship between Marcos, the US and the Philippines, the conflicts that came about in that relationship, the downfall of the regime, and the political transition that followed. The second part will analyze how the US used its influence over Marcos and the country to manage both the regime’s collapse and the establishment of a new and democratic one. The last section will be the conclusion and a short recommendation for further studies.

Ferdinand Marcos, Juan de la Cruz, and Uncle Sam

In 1946, the US gave the Philippines its independence after almost half a century of colonization. Ironically, colonialism was replaced with neocolonialism with the Philippines still under the tutelage of the U.S. in almost every sphere.

The Philippine government was prohibited from changing the value of its currency without the approval of the U.S. President, and U.S. investors were given special investment rights in the Philippines.2

Washington retained two huge military bases and many smaller ones on a 99-year, rent-free lease. The Philippine city of Olongapo became, in the words of a 1959 account in Time magazine, "the only foreign city run lock, stock and barrel by the U.S. Navy." The terms of the bases agreement were revised several times over the next few decades, but as U.S. officials acknowledged even in the 1970s nowhere did the United States have more extensive and more unhindered base rights than in the Philippines. These bases served for years as the logistic hub for U.S. interventions from Vietnam to the Persian Gulf; Washington, not Manila, decided how these bases would be used and against whom, and the Philippine people were not informed of the presence of nuclear weapons on their soil.3

From 1946 to 1972, the Philippines was a formal democracy in the sense of having contested elections. But it was a political system in which two coalitions of the wealthy elite, indistinguishable by ideology or program, competed for power, with a major determinant of success being the overt or covert backing of the U.S. government4 and Marcos was no exception.

Throughout his regime, Marcos was backed by the U.S. government providing him with monetary and military support. These, however, came as long as the U.S. was assured of keeping its military bases in the Philippines. When Marcos declared martial law, the U.S. did not condemn it and as a U.S. Senate staff report summarized the U.S. reaction, "military bases and a familiar government in the Philippines are more important than the preservation of democratic institutions which were imperfect at best”.5

Despite the efforts of the Philippine elite and their U.S. allies, nationalism picked up strength during the 1970s. Students, workers, and peasants were disenchanted with the “parity” agreement, the U.S. bases, the American intervention in Vietnam, foreign investment, and the Philippine Constitution thereby threatening U.S. interests.

Several authors argued that Marcos fueled the nationalist passions so that he could emerge as the savior of threatened U.S. and Filipino elite interests, including funding some of the radical student demonstrators. Marcos may have also been behind the calling of a constitutional convention, and there is no doubt that he manipulated the proceedings through outright bribery6.

Thus, while making the nationalists feel they were heard (telling them that the U.S. military bases should be removed due to security reasons), he also convinced the U.S. government that the best way to protect its interests in the Philippines is through Martial Law. This manipulative character of Marcos shows that while he was heavily dependent on the U.S. for financial and military assistance, he had the upper hand.

The Re-establishment of Democracy in the Philippines

Discontentment and disgust with the regime proliferated among the military leaders (Juan Ponce Enrile and Gen. Fidel Valdez Ramos) and officers with a plot against Marcos already being planned.

Marcos’ health started to fail him, Church opposition with regards to the regime’s violation of human rights came about, and there was an economic crisis after the Aquino assassination making the Makati Business District a major opposition center. As things continued to get worse, it seemed that the Communist Party of the Philippines (later made an alliance with the New People’s Army which is the separatist movement of Muslims) benefited most from the massive protests.

Concerned about the political succession and worried about the growing revolutionary movement, the U.S. changed its policy and began pressuring Marcos to hold fairer elections. While the Catholic Church (headed by Cardinal Jaime Sin) and businessmen supported the opposition in the 1984 legislative polls, the communist party boycotted it making the revival of a united front impossible.

With budding American criticism, Marcos called for a snap presidential election.

The opposition chose Corazon Aquino (wife of assassinated Ninoy Aquino) who was able to receive strong support from the electorate, campaign volunteers, the Church and business group. The Aquino camp also kept close contact with Enrile’s rebel group, RAM (Reform Armed Forces Now Movement).

After a fraudulent election, RAM’s plan for a coup ‘de état was discovered, leading Cardinal Sin to mobilize thousands of civilians—nuns, students, businessmen and intellectuals gathered in the streets of Epifanio De Los Santos Avenue—to protect the rebels dubbed as “People Power” putting Aquino into power on the 26th of February, 1986.

Jubilation of “freedom” was of course, not without its own flaws. On the night of February 25th─after the Marcoses were taken out of the country and brought to Hawaii by U.S. officials, a mob broke into the Malacanang Palace, destroyed two Press Cooperatives, and looted its furniture and appliances, as well as important documents.

ANALYSIS

We now come to discuss how the U.S.—with its broad influence over the Philippines and Marcos—contributed to the regime’s downfall and how it “managed” the transition by exerting pressure on Marcos and switching its support to the civilian moderate opposition, led by Corazon Aquino7.

Under the Foreign Power and Domestic Actor Relations of Snyder’s analysis on the combined structural and voluntarist perspectives, he argues that: (a) foreign powers can influence transitions from sultanism by strengthening the capacities of various domestic actors and shaping the menu of political strategies they can choose from, thus reducing or enhancing their maneuverability; and (b) when foreign actors have limited leverage over the dictator, their ability to influence the course of political development is restricted to supporting the dictator’s opposition or to intervening directly.8

In the Philippine case, it is obvious to see that Marcos was heavily dependent on the U.S. to supply military and financial aid as well as in establishing his domestic patronage networks. This made his regime vulnerable to collapse in case the Americans turned against him—which they eventually did.

The U.S. supported the formation of the military rebel group, the Reform Armed Forces Now Movement (RAM) in 1985 while threatening to cut off Marcos’ military aid if his troops attacked the rebels (although the coup failed, it was also supported by the Catholic Church and millions of civilians). Moreover, the U.S. saw the moderate opposition led by Aquino and the military soft-liners (RAM) as acceptable replacements to Marcos because of their organizational coherence and broad popular support.

With the presence of an acceptable and viable civilian alternative, the U.S. was able to use its leverage over Marcos, take him out of power and positioned the moderates in place. Furthermore, it is good to note that unlike other transitions from sultanism, the military was not able to take control because of their dependence on the civilians. As an addition, the U.S. managed the transition so that state power was never within the maximalist NDF’s reach.

CONCLUSION

In the Philippine context, the U.S. was able to identify an acceptable and viable civilian alternative to Marcos. This enabled the U.S. to use its leverage and influence over Marcos to take him out of power and put the country back into democratic and civilian doing so, the U.S. backed the Aquino-led moderate opposition and supported the military-soft liners (RAM) while threatening to put Marcos in an economic and military “sabotage”. Moreover, the U.S. prevented the maximalists from taking power.

Conversely, it’s good to note that U.S. was able to do all of these because structural factors were in their favor: the moderates coalesced with the military soft-liners and not the maximalists – the military coup against Marcos allowed moderates to replace him without the maximalists gaining power; the military-soft liners accepted the dominant moderate-opposition as a viable replacement – if an unacceptable group to the military such as the maximalist NDF dominated the opposition, the RAM officers might have opted to postpone their coup until they felt they had enough power without civilian assistance, or they could have chosen to stay with Marcos preferring a sultanistic dictator rather than a leftist government.

Support from the Church, the business sector and most of the society also favored the transition.

Suggested Areas for Future Study

Thus far, the paper has explained how the U.S. used its power to influence the downfall of the Marcos regime as well as the democratic transition in the Philippines. However, it has not covered why the U.S. suddenly changed sides. Contrary to common knowledge, the Reagan administration hung onto Marcos until the last possible moment. What happened way back in 1986?

One possible angle in answering this question is to asses the interests of the U.S. Aside from its explicit agenda of “spreading democracy”, skeptics and former Malacanang insiders argue that the U.S. was largely concerned about its control over the military bases in the Philippines. It has been pointed out—with much suppression, however—that during the last years of Marcos in power, there has been considerable clash of interest between Marcos and the U.S.’ intentions on the bases agreement.

When Aquino came into power, despite her best efforts, the new post-Marcos constitution stated that "foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate." Nationalist sentiment was strong enough in the country that in 1991 the Philippine Senate voted against extending the U.S.-Philippines Military Bases Agreement. But almost as soon as the vote was taken, the U.S. tried with the help of cooperative Philippine officials to get around the constitution.9

Could this have paved the way for the U.S. to change sides to secure their bases? Was Marcos no longer capable of securing the interests of the U.S. that it needed someone other than Marcos to do the job? A vague but sensible answer appeared almost a decade later when in 1999, an agreement was concluded giving the U.S. "access" to Philippine bases and in 2002 hundreds of U.S. troops were sent to the Philippines to help fight the Abu Sayyaf guerrillas. Today, according to an Agence France Presse report,

"the Pentagon is working to maintain on the Philippine islands what US Pacific Command head Admiral Thomas Fargo called 'critical tactical mobility platforms,' including UH-1H helicopters, C-130 transport aircraft, heavy trucks and patrol boats that could be used in case of major U.S. military operations in the region.10

Of course, these U.S. troops and equipment need not violate the Philippine constitution if only President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo would submit the appropriate treaty to the Senate. But suspecting that such a treaty would be voted down, the Arroyo administration and its U.S. counterpart have chosen to simply ignore the constitution.11

With these as a starting point, further study can be conducted to undertake a critical analysis to determine if the “U.S. Bases Conflict” claim is indeed a feasible reason to explain why the U.S. changed bet on their cards.

The Catholic Church also exerted a big influence on the “People Power Revolution” being one of the country’s strongest and independent non-governmental institutions. Cardinal Jaime Sin was able to mobilize millions of civilians to protect the military rebels as well as making a political alliance between Corazon Aquino and Salvador Laurel (the latter earlier announced his candidacy for the Presidency) during the 1986 snap elections.

The contribution of the Catholic Church—and to some extent, the Vatican—to the fall of the Marcos regime and the democratization of the country should also be analyzed in its own right.

1 Richard Snyder, “Paths out of Sultanistic Regimes: Combining Structural and Voluntarist Perspectives” in Sultanistic Regimes Edited by H.E. Chehabi & Juan J. Linz (1998)

2 Stephen Shalom, The Philippine Model (Znet Commentary, 2003)

3 Stephen Shalom, The United States and the Philippines: A Study of Neocolonialism (Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1981)

4 Raymond Bonner, Waltzing with a Dictator: The Marcoses and the Making of American Foreign Policy (New York: Times Books, 1987)

5 Staff Report prepared for the use of the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Korea and the Philippines: November 1972, Committee Print, 93rd Cong., 1st sess., (Feb. 18, 1973)

6 Richard Snyder, “Paths out of Sultanistic Regimes: Combining Structural and Voluntarist Perspectives” in Sultanistic Regimes Edited by H.E. Chehabi & Juan J. Linz (1998)

7 Richard Snyder, “Paths out of Sultanistic Regimes: Combining Structural and Voluntarist Perspectives” in Sultanistic Regimes Edited by H.E. Chehabi & Juan J. Linz (1998)

8 Richard Snyder, “Paths out of Sultanistic Regimes: Combining Structural and Voluntarist Perspectives” in Sultanistic Regimes Edited by H.E. Chehabi & Juan J. Linz (1998)

9 Stephen Shalom, The Philippine Model (Znet Commentary, 2003)

10 Ibid.

11 Ibid.