Mariel Raizza Argonza

POSC204: Environment, Health, and Ageing in a Global Context

Essay 1

HOW USEFUL IS THE CONCEPT OF “WELFARE STATE REGIMES” FOR UNDERSTANDING THE PROVISION OF SOCIAL WELFARE IN EAST AND SOUTH ASIA?

Introduction

Academia has tried to explain and categorize the characteristics of the East Asian welfare states as having their own distinct regimes different if not superior to Western welfare state regimes presented by Espring-Anderson’s The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism1—liberal, conservative, and social-democratic states—and previously, Holliday2 added a new category to Espring-Anderson’s typology calling it the “productivist” state especially for the East Asian models.

While dismissing arguments for culture and “Asian values” as basis of explanations, Holliday holds that what makes the productivtist welfare state different from Espring-Anderson’s classic typologies is that social policy is subordinated by the state’s pro-economic-growth policies rather than being neither privileged or subordinated. While this claim may appear somewhat true on a broad scale, the problem (as is usually the case with typologies) is that it tends to miss out the idiosyncratic factors that might have contributed in subordinating social policy or if it was at all. Why is or was it subordinated to economic policy? Is it being subordinated intended or accidental? Can we pinpoint where and when this subordination started? Moreover, in some cases, we shall see that social policy is not subordinated but is used as a smokescreen or as a legitimating device.

In this paper, I will discuss the conceptual relevance of “Welfare State Regimes” to East and South Asian welfare provision. I argue that while the typologies are helpful in neatly organizing and comparing states according to identifiable similarities and differences3, one must proceed with caution when it comes to analysis and drawing conclusions especially if it is to be emulated in other places. My focus will be on health insurance and pension systems4 in Japan, Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South Korea because they have all achieved advanced forms of welfare systems with contrasting experiences and are usually the most categorized.

The next section will present the current models of welfare state regimes from Espring-Andersen and Holliday paving the way for individual discussions of the above-mentioned countries’ experiences in welfare and pension provision, and finally the conclusion.

Classifications of Welfare State Regimes

For the purposes of this paper, I refer to Espring-Andersen and Holliday’s classifications of welfare state regimes with more emphasis on the latter’s. Espring-Andersen presents three welfare state variations grouped by the degree of their social rights—entitlement to receive welfare provisions; stratification effects—degree of equality; and relationships between the state, market, and the family—provider of welfare. These are the liberal5, conservative6, and social-democratic welfare states7. It is important to note that Espring Andersen came up with this typology under a European context without any reference to Asia as a whole.

One important factor in Holliday’s regimes is that social policy is subordinated by economic policy unlike in liberal and conservative regimes where it is neither privileged nor subordinated or in social-democratic regimes where it is privileged8. Indeed in Japan and the 4 NIEs, social democrats’ participation in demanding for social welfare was weak to nil and it is usually the conservatives that introduce them9 partly because most of these governments were one-partisan for a long period of time. Holliday, recognizing the heterogeneity of these East Asian states, comes up with three sub-divisions of a productivist welfare state regime: facilitative, developmental-universalist, and developmental particularist10.

Holliday identifies Hong Kong as a facilitative productivist welfare state regime. In here, social rights are very minimal and voluntary-supplied social security is usually for the aged while the well off can purchase private insurance. It is almost like the liberal regime where the market is prioritized leading to high social stratification.

Under developmental-universalist, Holliday includes Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. In these states, he argues that welfare provision is almost universal (especially Japan) but linked to the position of their productive elements: for example, industrial workers in South Korea in the 1960s, and the military and state bureaucrats in Taiwan11. As with the conservative regime, the stratification effects show a reinforcement of the social structure (that makes the state productive) while there is a strong emphasis on the market and family to provide welfare.

Finally, in the developmental-particularist, Holliday identifies Singapore with its minimal and forced individual provision (through the Central Provident Fund). Thus, access to welfare is strictly based on one’s own contributions that are not redistributive. Notably, Singapore has a widely successful public housing program that is also linked to the CPF. That aside, the stratification is very much like the developmental-universalist where there is a reinforcement of the positions of productive elements12. There is also an emphasis on the family13.

Now that we have outlined the current welfare regime models, we can now turn our attention to the factors and events that contributed in making these East Asian welfare states what they are today and find out if social policy is indeed subordinated to economic policy.

Origins of East Asian Welfare States

Japan

Kwon describes Japan’s welfare provision as a threefold development14. While the American-written Japanese Constitution of 1947 gave the Japanese rights to “a minimum standard of healthy civilized life15”, (universal rights to pension was already established since 1961) it was in 1973 when Prime Minister Ohara (right-wing, LDP) when he promised that his government will catch-up with Western welfare states16. Unfortunately, this was never realized be due to the oil shocks of the same year and then by an economic recession. Later in 1979, the LDP through Prime Minister Ohira stressed the need for a Japanese-style of welfare state instead of a Western one that causes “welfare disease17”. The ruling LDP proposed a welfare system organized around the family with the market as chief provider of welfare while the government would maintain a minimal role18.

However, with industrialization came the consequences of a declining trend in fertility and birth rates on one end and an increasingly ageing society on the other that could seriously mean difficulties for a universal welfare system. The 1980s then, saw the third stage in Japanese welfare aiming to prepare for an ageing society19 as well as the state moving from regulator to provider20. Indeed, aside from the state-funded National Pension, citizens over 70 or bedridden citizens over 65 were guaranteed access to “Health Service for the Aged” funded by local government heads but was reformed around 1983 together with other welfare schemes to prevent a financial crisis as well as a “welfare backlash” (before the reforms, a considerable number of aged people checked into geriatric hospitals significantly occupying facilities and the staff’s time21). Some of the reforms included central and local governments bearing a larger share in financing Health Service for the Aged22 (previously, the state-funded National Health Insurance bore much of the cost) as well as requiring the elderly to pay a certain amount for their health services. Notably, the Ministry of Finance managed to have better control over both revenue and expenditure for social policy by pressuring LDP politicians and the Ministry of Health and Welfare into accepting a consumption tax in 1989 that would be used to finance social welfare expenditure23.

In other groups, funding comes in various forms depending on whether one is an employee of SMEs or large-scale companies, public employees, retired public employees, farmers and seamen amongst others. For example, funds are automatically collected from salaries of public employees (Mutual Aid Associations) while insurance groups cover employees of large-scale companies24. Again, on top of these schemes, the State guarantees universal pension to all citizens.

A few points before moving forward: one, PM Tanaka’s promise of a Western-style welfare state in 1973 was more of him saving the LDP’s (waning) popularity, responding to the emergence of leftist local governors, and citizen movements on environmental issues than anything else, Kwon argues. Two, what follows is a tic-tac-toe game between the Ministry of Health and Welfare and Ministry of Ministry if Finance with the former emerging victorious and thus passed its proposals for modernizing the system—in an almost canny move, MOHW’s Minister Sonoda created a project team to draw proposals on nation-wide free health care for the aged instead of his Ministry25. Three, the same thing happened when PM Ohira envisioned a Japanese-style welfare system; the MOHW came up with committees to review policies for health and medical care (of which the reviewers are the MOF and the LDP) and thus resulted in the 1983 health reforms26. Four, it was not lucky the third time because the MOF pressured the MOHW to limit its’ spending according to its budget and eventually, the consumption tax was approved. Along with it came reforms such as keeping public spending below 50 as well as making it easier for people over 60 to find jobs27.

Clearly, when the Japanese welfare system took off it did not seem to be (deliberately) subordinated by economic policy at all. In fact, with the government’s and the MOHW’s efforts to respond to the changing socio-political environment, they even managed to work around the MOF’s non-welfare friendly economic policies—twice! Finally, even when the MOF did finally manage to control welfare spending, welfare and pension access remain universal and a key arena for political battles and garnering public support.

Hong Kong

Hong Kong’s welfare system provides a contrasting image from that of Japan’s with its very minimal social security. Moreover, public health insurance is not intended to cover the entire population28. Sure enough, taken with Hong Kong’s heavy emphasis on economic growth, it seems tempting to conclude that social policy is indeed subordinated to economic policy. Well, not entirely. To begin with, Hong Kong has a significant public housing program under the Home Ownership Scheme29. Going back further in time, we find that the British colonial government up until 1995 funded much of the welfare programs with a small amount from the lottery and charity groups30. This is carried over with the Hong Kong government today but with more NGOs as the direct providers of welfare although they are funded and are accountable to the government.

Hong Kong’s social security comprises of the Comprehensive Social Security Assistance and the Special Needs Allowance, the former providing income support for those with incomes below a prescribed level31 and the latter for the elderly and disabled32. This is in line with Hong Kong’s discouragement of dependency on the state while helping only some groups of people who cannot afford a minimal standard of living33 and placing emphasis on the family’s role as provider—Hong Kong people do not see the government as responsible for providing social welfare and do not want to be dragged into providing other people’s living34.

There were previous efforts, however to offer a universal pension for the aged when the last Hong Kong Governor Chris Patten proposed the Old Age Pension Scheme as an honorable retreat from the British. It was to be a pay-as-you-go system with the aged receiving immediate flat-rate benefits from the current working populations35. The proposal died when Beijing (soon to take over Hong Kong in 1997) vetoed the proposal claiming such a scheme would be too expensive36. One significant problem would be taxing the working population even if it were forced savings—there has been an on-going trend for many Hong Kong citizens to emigrate to Canada, the US, and Australia and thus it would be unlikely for them to pay for social insurance if they feel they are unlikely to benefit from it37 or are not intending to benefit from it in the first place.

So is social policy subordinated to economic policy in Hong Kong? Not really. As we have seen, even if the government may want to suppress social policy or keep it at a minimum, the Hong Kong people are indifferent to such a system and would rather depend on themselves.

Singapore

Singapore shares a lot of common features with Hong Kong—both are financial hubs, two of the most open and fastest growing economies in the world, were British colonies, and both boast very successful public housing schemes amongst others. They start to diverge, however when we consider social security. Singapore seems to cover a more comprehensive part of the population through the Central Provident Fund (CPF), a forced savings scheme where both employees and employers contribute certain amounts of money which can later be withdrawn for health insurance, pension, for their children’s education, and housing. In this case, citizenship does not guarantee access to welfare. CPF does not provide social security to non-members38 and nor does it provide transfer and redistribution of money. Kwon reports that only about 2000 people receive public assistance benefits after passing a strict means test39.

The government encourages private social security insurance and it retains a largely regulatory role. Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew together with the ruling right-wing People’s Action Party maintains that Singaporeans should not expect free handouts and assistance from the state40. Correspondingly, the CPF does not receive any financial assistance from the government but provides a massive amount of assets and capital to it41. CPF comprised 15 percent of Singapore’s GDP at S$11,287.6mn42 in 199443. Aside from it being a safety net device for its members and a macro-economic tool for the government, the CPF is tied to Singapore’s public housing program. A certain fraction44 of one’s CPF account can be used in purchasing a home. Launched in 1968, the Housing Development Board has managed to give 90.2 percent of Singaporean households their own houses in 199045.

A few important points are to be made here. One, the British introduced the CPF in 1953 as an honorable retreat to prepare Singapore for independence. Two, the evolution and the continuity of the CPF can be largely attributed to the dominance of Lee Kuan Yew’s People’s Action Party (PAP)46. Of course, this is not to say that Lee’s ascension to power was an easy one—he had to deal with poverty, threat of the left wing trying to take power, hostile and bigger neighbors, and racial riots to name a few. Three, and related to the second point, the CPF and the housing scheme played very important roles in nation building. For Lee Kuan Yew, the main threat to Singapore was the population’s lack of nationhood and believed that if people owned their homes, they would be more likely to fight for the country47. Indeed, while the CPF remains to be operated by a quasi-governmental body, the CPF has been a tool for racial integration by regulating the mix and amount of ethnic groups in each housing estate to match the country’s profile48. Four, this racial profiling means opposition politicians have less chances on capitalizing ethnic issues as well as preventing ethnic minorities to enter the parliament. Five and finally, the success not only of the CPF but also of Singapore as an economic stronghold under the PAP reinforced its popularity and legitimacy amongst the people. In this sense, social policy is not really subordinated to economic policy: it appears that on one end, it was used to unite the country into moving forward and pursuing economic development and thereafter created a (somewhat) virtuous cycle—work, pay CPF, receive benefits, continuous benefits is an incentive to work; and on the other end, legitimized and solidified the bulwark that is the PAP.

South Korea

The genesis of the South Korean welfare system can be traced to Park Chung Hee’s military coup d'état of 1961 of which he spearheaded. His government introduced two main welfare programs: the employer-funded Industrial Accident Insurance Fund targeted at industrial workers wherein more accident-prone workplaces had to pay larger contributions; and a 10-year pilot program, the National Health Insurance which sought to cover large families who have low income and risk-prone49. The latter, however proved to be a failure making little progress and running into financial problems due to its non-compulsory terms50. In 1976, after a recommendation-tied aid loan from the US, the NHI’s funding was made compulsory in 1977 where both employers and employees contribute (income-related). The funds were managed by public agencies unlike Singapore’s quasi-governmental CPF Board. The NHI gradually covered large-scale companies, public employees51, and then private school teachers providing health care by 1987 to most of these people52. However, farmers, the self-employed, and the unemployed remained outside this system because their financial profiles were harder to determine and did not have employers to pay half of their contributions.

For the most part, the government was first interested in efficiency gains rather than social goals and in 1987 the government achieved the capacity to pay half of the “no-employer” group’s contribution and introduced a non-contributory Health Assistance for the Poor program53. Another scheme worth mentioning is the National Pension Programme implemented in 1973 and re-introduced by President Rho in 1988 as an election promise and like the NHI, started with salaried employees especially in the manufacturing industry54 calculating payout according to a combination of flat-rate and income-related schemes55. Redistribution under these welfare schemes is present but minimal and there have also been issues about the rigidity of the system that it leaves out people who are in dire need—the poverty ceiling is so low that a large proportion of needy people are not entitled to benefits56. Additionally, the procedure of selecting beneficiaries often uses local knowledge and records of previous years instead of means-test57.

Access to South Korean welfare is based on contributions—this is the baseline, if you want benefits you must have made prior contributions58—citizenship does not entitle social rights to a decent life59. This somewhat resembles the (less fragmented) Singaporean-CPF, although the South Korean government made a gradual shift from regulator and then somewhat to provider instead of just being a regulator60. This is of course related to the political environment starting with President Park—during his time, economic development was the overriding common good61, poverty alleviation was defined in terms of employment and food rather than relational or relative understandings of equity62. Economic development is big factor for regime-legitimization but it does take time for results to show, and so in South Korea, the first social welfare programs introduced in the 60s’ compensated for this63. Chun Doo-Hwan built upon the same idea—but with unsatisfactory results after assuming presidency with his own coup after President Park’s assassination64.

So while economic development was the overriding common good, social policy could not have been completely subordinated to economic policy because it was used to, if I may use the word, distract people from the lengthier process of pursuing economic development.

Taiwan

Taiwan’s welfare system to have stagnated until the 1980s after the introduction of the Labor Insurance program with only two main social insurance programs: the Labor Insurance and Government Employees’ Insurance65. Welfare programs introduced after 1980 resulted in fragmentation with fourteen major programs run by various ministries in both the central and provincial governments66 although most of provided health insurance67. Taiwan’s National Health Insurance of 1995 fused all the existing health insurance schemes into one program to fill the gaps of the fourteen programs by covering those possibly missed out before the integration68. The government financed the NHI according to job categories paying the largest premiums for seasonal workers or those who do not have permanent employers, farmers, veterans, and low-income households as well as those who “Others” who previously did not have health insurance69.

The government appears to have become a provider but Kwon argues that it should not be seen as one because its contributions were made as if it was an employer especially to “government employees” and their dependents70. In Taiwan, government employees can include private-school teachers and this is partly why these groups were the first ones to receive social insurance71. This tilt towards state employees can be traced to the Kuomintang’s exodus to Taiwan in 1949. Notably, the Labor Insurance program was already a part of the KMT government’s manifesto four years back in an attempt to quell Communist movements72, however the KMT did not manage to enforce it due to time constraints and were then forced out of the mainland73. The KMT attempted to use the Labor Insurance program to legitimize itself not only with those whole left with them but with the native Taiwanese who perceived the Labor Insurance as being foreign, and something they did not demand or deem necessary74. At this time, the government remained largely as regulator while employees (20 percent) and employers (80 percent) were to finance the Labor Insurance thru contributions managed by a private company (Taiwan Life Insurance); Chiang Kai-Shek did not want any extra government spending75. This regulatory role would be coupled by a provider role as the political environment started to change.

As their stay in Taiwan lengthened, as mainland China received international recognition, and as Taiwan was expelled from the UN in 1971, political problems of the KMT’s legitimacy also surfaced domestically76. The greatest threat to the KMT was the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) pushing for democratization, Taiwanisation, and better social welfare coverage77. Previously, the NHI was supposed to be implemented in 2000 but under pressure socially and politically, the KMT under Chiang Ching-kuo launched the NHI earlier in 1995 as well as lifted martial law in 1987 paving the way for democratisation78. Democratisation gave social policy a fertile ground to flourish as competitive elections allowed voters to voice their demands for better welfare while political parties tended to capitalize on these issues for their platforms—the DDP, for example sought to introduce an old-age pension scheme79 peaking in political importance in 200380. As with the previous countries, social policy in Taiwan does not appear to be subordinated by economic policy—rather, it was used to legitimize the authority of the KMT for the most part until it was demanded to be of great significance.

Conclusion

Before we can answer the conceptual relevance of welfare state regimes in East and South Asia, a few points must be made.

Firstly, the role of the state varies from regulator ‘with vested interests’ as in Singapore to ‘almost like a’ provider as in Taiwan. I say this because in the former, although a quasi-governmental body without any state subvention manages CPF contributions, the CPF constitutes a large sum of the country’s GDP, as a fund source for various investments, as well as providing macro-economic stability. In the latter, although the state covers its population with the contributions-funded NHI, it still requires its beneficiaries to co-pay health fees.

Secondly, the funding and consequently, what determines access to welfare also varies in East and South Asia. Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan all provide (close to) universal health care insurance thru a mixture of contribution (note in South Korea that contributions hold more ground than citizenship) and tax-based funding but in terms of old-age pension provision, Japan took the lead under the same set-up. Singapore and Hong Kong are more minimalist but there are differences between them as well. Singapore’s CPF provides welfare services to its members only and maintains minimal provision to the poorest. In Hong Kong, the government targets welfare assistance mostly to poor and aged citizens while allowing the better-off to purchase private social insurance. Both Singapore and Hong Kong have great emphasis of “no free lunch” from the state but rather self or family reliance. Lastly, both have pursued massive and widely successful public housing programs.

Thirdly, conservative political forces have mostly dominated politics in the cases discussed. Curiously, the conservatives instead of social-democratic parties actively pursued social policy. But this of course makes sense when given the fact that parties such as the PAP of Singapore and LDP (a misnomer) of Japan had long tenancies in office and had more opportunity to advance social policy according to their advantage and goals.

Fourthly and related to the previous point, social policy in all five cases did not seem to be completely subordinated by economic policy as Holliday claims. Rather, social policy in South and East Asian welfare states were used either for government legitimation and continuity (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore), nation-building and political control (Singapore), and in Hong Kong, social policy is met by indifference.

Finally, with all these points in place, I am of the stand that conceptually, welfare state regimes is relevant only up to the point of roughly categorizing and comparing the welfare programs of the discussed countries and region but not very useful in terms of explaining how each of them came to be and why. It is still less useful if one intends to draw policy decisions such as emulating a certain type of regime. As seen in Hong Kong, you cannot force people to contribute to a provident fund for social welfare if they themselves do not feel they are to benefit and would rather emigrate. In closing, I do not consider the efforts and contributions of authors such as Espring-Andersen and Holliday as completely useless and nor do I think categorization is conceptually flawed. In the end, we all do seek some sense of order, to make sense of complexities and to come up with distinguishable patterns—welfare state regime typologies are exactly that.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Esping-Andersen, Gosta, “Introduction”, in Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, Polity:Cambridge, 1990. pp.1-34.

Holliday, Ian, “Productivist Welfare Capitalism: Social Policy in East Asia”, Political Studies, 48:4, 2000, pp.706-723.

Kwon, Huck-ju, “Democracy and the Politics of Social Welfare: A Comparative Analysis of Welfare Systems in East Asia”, in The East Asian Welfare Model: Welfare Orientalism and the State, Roger Goodman, Gordon White, and Huck-ju Kwon (eds.), Routledge: London, 1998, pp.27-74

Anderson, S.J., “Welfare Policy and Politics in Japan: Beyond the Developmental State”, Paragon House: New York, 1993.

Chua, H., “Social Welfare: the Way Ahead”, in From Colony to SAR: Hong Kong’s Challenges Ahead, Joseph Cheung and Sonny Lo (eds), Chinese University Press: Hong Kong, 1995.

Kato, J., “The Problem of Bureaucratic Rationality: Tax Politics in Japan”, Princeton University Press: New Jersey, 1994.

Lau, Siu-Kai, “Society and Politics in Hong Kong”, Chinese University Press: Hong Hong, 1982.

Ooi, Giok Ling, “The Housing and Development Board’s Ethnic Integration Policy” in The Management of Ethnic Relations in Public Housing, Ooi Giok Ling, Sharon Siddique, and Soh Kay Cheng (eds.), Institute of Policy Studies and Time Academic Press: Singapore,1993.

Sherraden, M., “Social Policy Based on Assets: Singapore’s Central Provident Fund”, paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Association for Asian Studies, Washington,1995.

Wong, Joseph, “Healthy Democracies: Welfare Politics in Taiwan and South Korea”, Cornell: New York, 2004, pp.43-61.

“Chapter 3: Authoritarianism and the Origins of Social Insurance”, in Healthy Democracies: Welfare Politics in Taiwan and South Korea, Cornell: New York, 2004, pp.43-61.

“Chapter 4: Democracy and the idea of social welfare”, in Healthy Democracies: Welfare Politics in Taiwan and South Korea, Cornell: New York, 2004, pp.134-152.

“Chapter 7: Democracy and the Idea of Social Welfare”, in Healthy Democracies: Welfare Politics in Taiwan and South Korea, Cornell: New York, 2004, pp.134-152.

Marshall, T.H., “Citizenship and Social Class”, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge,

Hashimoto, Tomisaburo, “Constitution of Welfare Society”, The Policy Affairs Research Council of the LDP, Tokyo, 1979.

1 Gosta Esping-Andersen, “Introduction”, in Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, Polity:Cambridge, 1990. pp.1-34.

2 Ian Holliday, “Productivist Welfare Capitalism: Social Policy in East Asia”, Political Studies, 48:4, 2000, pp.706-723.

3 For example, the state’s role or degree of involvement and access to provisions.

4 With minor mention of public housing in Singapore and Hong Kong.

5 Targets low-income strata; citizenship does not insure welfare coverage; emphasis on market and self-reliance through work; affluent have access to better and private social insurance; examples are the US, Canada, and Australia.

6 Universal welfare provision but depends on class status or contributions; preserves existing classes; emphasis on family as provider of welfare and state will only step-in if the family’s capacity is exhausted; women usually excluded from social insurance and instead given family benefits to encourage childbirth; examples are Austria, France, Germany, and Italy.

7 Universal welfare through citizenship; low social stratification; state directly gives benefits to children, the aged, and needy while still emphasizing on family-hood but encourages women to work; expensive system and relies on full employment with little social problems; benign dependency on state; examples are Sweden, Norway, and Denmark,

8 Ian Holliday, “Productivist Welfare Capitalism: Social Policy in East Asia”, Political Studies, 48:4, 2000, pp.706-723.

9 Huck-ju Kwon, “Democracy and the Politics of Social Welfare: A Comparative Analysis of Welfare Systems in East Asia”, in The East Asian Welfare Model: Welfare Orientalism and the State, Roger Goodman, Gordon White, and Huck-ju Kwon (eds.), Routledge: London, 1998, pp.27-74.

10 Ibid.

11 Opscit.

12 Ian Holliday, “Productivist Welfare Capitalism: Social Policy in East Asia”, Political Studies, 48:4, 2000, pp.706-723.

13 Ibid.

14 Huck-ju Kwon, “Democracy and the Politics of Social Welfare: A Comparative Analysis of Welfare Systems in East Asia”, in The East Asian Welfare Model: Welfare Orientalism and the State, Roger Goodman, Gordon White, and Huck-ju Kwon (eds.), Routledge: London, 1998, pp.27-74.

15 Opscit.

16 Opscit.

17 Tomisaburo Hashimoto, “Constitution of Welfare Society”, The Policy Affairs Research Council of the LDP, Tokyo, 1979.

18 Anderson, 1993 cited in Huck-ju Kwon, “Democracy and the Politics of Social Welfare: A Comparative Analysis of Welfare Systems in East Asia”, in The East Asian Welfare Model: Welfare Orientalism and the State, Roger Goodman, Gordon White, and Huck-ju Kwon (eds.), Routledge: London, 1998, pp.27-74.

19 Huck-ju Kwon, “Democracy and the politics of social welfare: a comparative analysis of welfare systems in East Asia”, in The East Asian Welfare Model: Welfare Orientalism and the State, Roger Goodman, Gordon White, and Huck-ju Kwon (eds.), Routledge: London, 1998, pp.27-74.

20 Notice how this deviates from Holliday’s typology of a developmental-universalist in terms of who provides welfare (at least for a certain period of time).

21 Opscit.

22 Ibid.

23 Kato, 1994 cited in Huck-ju Kwon, “Democracy and the Politics of Social Welfare: A Comparative Analysis of Welfare Systems in East Asia”, in The East Asian Welfare Model: Welfare Orientalism and the State, Roger Goodman, Gordon White, and Huck-ju Kwon (eds.), Routledge: London, 1998, pp.27-74.

24 Ibid.

25 Huck-ju Kwon, “Democracy and the Politics of Social Welfare: A Comparative Analysis of Welfare Systems in East Asia”, in The East Asian Welfare Model: Welfare Orientalism and the State, Roger Goodman, Gordon White, and Huck-ju Kwon (eds.), Routledge: London, 1998, pp.27-74.

26 Ibid.

27 Ibid.

28 Huck-ju Kwon, “Democracy and the Politics of Social Welfare: A Comparative Analysis of Welfare Systems in East Asia”, in The East Asian Welfare Model: Welfare Orientalism and the State, Roger Goodman, Gordon White, and Huck-ju Kwon (eds.), Routledge: London, 1998, pp.27-74.

29 Ibid.

30 Ibid.

31 Elderly over 60 years old received about HK$1505 monthly in 1995.

32 Normal disability receives a payout of HK$970 monthly in 1995.

33Huck-ju Kwon, “Democracy and the Politics of Social Welfare: A Comparative Analysis of Welfare Systems in East Asia”, in The East Asian Welfare Model: Welfare Orientalism and the State, Roger Goodman, Gordon White, and Huck-ju Kwon (eds.), Routledge: London, 1998, pp.27-74.

34 Lau, 1982, cited in Huck-ju Kwon, “Democracy and the Politics of Social Welfare: A Comparative Analysis of Welfare Systems in East Asia”, in The East Asian Welfare Model: Welfare Orientalism and the State, Roger Goodman, Gordon White, and Huck-ju Kwon (eds.), Routledge: London, 1998, pp.27-74.

35 Huck-ju Kwon, “Democracy and the Politics of Social Welfare: A Comparative Analysis of Welfare Systems in East Asia”, in The East Asian Welfare Model: Welfare Orientalism and the State, Roger Goodman, Gordon White, and Huck-ju Kwon (eds.), Routledge: London, 1998, pp.27-74.

36 Ibid.

37 Ibid.

38 Foreigners or even Singaporeans who are inactive with their contributions due to unemployment or sickness are excluded.

39 Huck-ju Kwon, “Democracy and the politics of social welfare: a comparative analysis of welfare systems in East Asia”, in The East Asian Welfare Model: Welfare Orientalism and the State, Roger Goodman, Gordon White, and Huck-ju Kwon (eds.), Routledge: London, 1998, pp.27-74.

40 Ibid.

41 Ibid.

42 Total savings were at S$58billion; some were invested in government bonds and the rest as advanced deposits under the Monetary Authority of Singapore as reserve funds for withdrawal by its members and invested at home and abroad

43 Opscit.

44 30 percent from Ordinary Account (account is shared with investments).

45 Huck-ju Kwon, “Democracy and the politics of social welfare: a comparative analysis of welfare systems in East Asia”, in The East Asian Welfare Model: Welfare Orientalism and the State, Roger Goodman, Gordon White, and Huck-ju Kwon (eds.), Routledge: London, 1998, pp.27-74.

46 Ibid.

47 Sherraden, 1995, cited in Huck-ju Kwon, “Democracy and the politics of social welfare: a comparative analysis of welfare systems in East Asia”, in The East Asian Welfare Model: Welfare Orientalism and the State, Roger Goodman, Gordon White, and Huck-ju Kwon (eds.), Routledge: London, 1998, pp.27-74.

48 Ooi, 1993; Chua, 1995 Huck-ju Kwon, “Democracy and the politics of social welfare: a comparative analysis of welfare systems in East Asia”, in The East Asian Welfare Model: Welfare Orientalism and the State, Roger Goodman, Gordon White, and Huck-ju Kwon (eds.), Routledge: London, 1998, pp.27-74.

49 Huck-ju Kwon, “Democracy and the politics of social welfare: a comparative analysis of welfare systems in East Asia”, in The East Asian Welfare Model: Welfare Orientalism and the State, Roger Goodman, Gordon White, and Huck-ju Kwon (eds.), Routledge: London, 1998, pp.27-74.

50 Ibid.

51 Joseph Wong, “Chapter 3: Authoritarianism and the Origins of Social Insurance”, in Healthy Democracies: Welfare Politics in Taiwan and South Korea, Cornell: New York, 2004, pp.43-61.

52 Huck-ju Kwon, “Democracy and the politics of social welfare: a comparative analysis of welfare systems in East Asia”, in The East Asian Welfare Model: Welfare Orientalism and the State, Roger Goodman, Gordon White, and Huck-ju Kwon (eds.), Routledge: London, 1998, pp.27-74.

53 Ibid.

54 Opscit.

55 Opscit.

56 Ibid.

57 Ibid.

58 Huck-ju Kwon, “Democracy and the Politics of Social Welfare: A Comparative Analysis of Welfare Systems in East Asia”, in The East Asian Welfare Model: Welfare Orientalism and the State, Roger Goodman, Gordon White, and Huck-ju Kwon (eds.), Routledge: London, 1998, pp.27-74.

59 T.H. Marshall, “Citizenship and Social Class”, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1950.

60 Opscit.

61 Ibid.

62 Joseph Wong, “Chapter 3: Authoritarianism and the Origins of Social Insurance”, in Healthy Democracies: Welfare Politics in Taiwan and South Korea, Cornell: New York, 2004, pp.43-61.

63 Opscit.

64 Joseph Wong, “Chapter 3: Authoritarianism and the Origins of Social Insurance”, in Healthy Democracies: Welfare Politics in Taiwan and South Korea, Cornell: New York, 2004, pp.43-61.

65 Huck-ju Kwon, “Democracy and the Politics of Social Welfare: A Comparative Analysis of Welfare Systems in East Asia”, in The East Asian Welfare Model: Welfare Orientalism and the State, Roger Goodman, Gordon White, and Huck-ju Kwon (eds.), Routledge: London, 1998, pp.27-74.

66 Ibid.

67 Both Labor Insurance and Government Employees’ Insurance were in lump-sum retirement payments together with health insurance while other programs had only health insurance provided.

68 Opscit.

69 Ibid.

70 Ibid.

71 Ibid.

72 Ibid.

73 Joseph Wong, “Chapter 3: Authoritarianism and the Origins of Social Insurance”, in Healthy Democracies: Welfare Politics in Taiwan and South Korea, Cornell: New York, 2004, pp.43-61.

74 Huck-ju Kwon, “Democracy and the Politics of Social Welfare: A Comparative Analysis of Welfare Systems in East Asia”, in The East Asian Welfare Model: Welfare Orientalism and the State, Roger Goodman, Gordon White, and Huck-ju Kwon (eds.), Routledge: London, 1998, pp.27-74.

75 Chiang Kai-Shek probably thought that their exile in Taiwain would be short-lived and maintaining the government’s size was the best strategy.

76 Opscit.

77 Ibid.

78 Ibid.

79 Ibid.

80 Joseph Wong, “Chapter 7: Democracy and the Idea of Social Welfare”, in Healthy Democracies: Welfare Politics in Taiwan and South Korea, Cornell: New York, 2004, pp.134-152.