What is the relationship between citizenship and the provision of social welfare?

Introduction

In his seminal work, Marshall’s (1950) Citizenship and Social Class examined citizenship as being composed and a succession of three components—civil, political, and social rights1. He argues that much of the 18th and 19th centuries were devoted to the development of the first two components such as the introduction of civil liberties and political participation respectively. Social rights in the form of economic and welfare rights are completely new phenomena in the 20th century2.

However, it does not in any way mean that the components are rigid. In fact, they actively interact with each other. For example, freedom of speech, a civil right is needed to actively participate in the political activities and to be able to do so effectively, one must have access to, for instance to education a social right. Moving forward, Marshall claims that social citizenship is universal a concept upon which some welfare states are built upon3. Indeed, some of Marshall’s contemporaries argue that the welfare state is a product of successful political mobilization to attain full citizenship under the context of industrialization4. Others argue of citizenship as de-stigmatisation from the English Poor Law (rather than de-commidification) as the welfare state “added dignity to security5”. For during the Poor Law, those seeking welfare were harshly stigmatised and branded as delinquents, undesirables, and paupers the demand for welfare was deliberately not sought for by the needy and thus useless6.

This paper discusses the relationship between citizenship and social welfare provision. I argue that the social rights of citizenship may be universal but this universality does not linearly or automatically transfer to social welfare provision. The next section will look at the conceptual origins of citizenship and its early associations with welfare provision. Building on that, the following section will then analyze contemporary cases of social welfare provision where citizenship may or may not be a pre-requisite for access. The paper will then close with its conclusion and recommendation.

On The Concept Of Citizenship

And so, Glaucon, we have arrived at the conclusion that in the perfect State wives and children are to be in common; and that all education and the pursuits of war and peace are to be common, and the best philosophers and the bravest warriors are to be their kings?

-Plato, The Republic: Book VIII

Citizenship has a lengthy history going back all the way to Platonic Athens. For the Greeks, to be a citizen of the polis meant one must possess intellect and socio-economic resources. That citizen must then use these to actively participate in judicial hearings and assemblies7. Such qualities were always linked to males, which means women, children, foreigners, and slaves amongst others were excluded as citizens. In feudal societies, the concept of citizenship is either non-existent or takes another form such as membership in a guild or a clan. Under such a setup, to be a member and to receive its corresponding benefits meant obeying the Lord’s or the guild master’s commands. Today, citizenship could mean being born in a particular nation and one of its benefits is being able to participate in political affairs under a given set of circumstances. In all cases, citizenship can be defined as both as status, and system of rights and obligations8 bestowed on those who are full members of a society9. Therefore, those who possess this status are equal in respect to the rights and duties with which that status is endowed10. It is quite a long definition and it needs some careful scrutinizing.

As a status, citizenship is bestowed to those who are full members of a society11. Note that what it means to be a “full member” of society will largely depend on factors such as time, norms, and location. As mentioned, ancient Greece gave the status of citizenship only to politically active males. Today’s conception is more inclusive: for instance, simply being born in a certain country can entitle the child citizenship. This is because rights have expanded as liberal-democratic thoughts developed. These rights, according to Marshall (1950) include civic, political, and social rights. Taking social rights into consideration, birth-acquired citizenship might include rights to health insurance, social insurance, pension, and education to mention a few. However, these rights are sometimes accompanied by obligations that the citizen must fulfill—after all citizenship is not a passive process12. For example, health care may be provided if a citizen is paying taxes. In other cases, health care is provided regardless of taxation but is based solely on citizenship.

Going back to status, every citizen is made equal in terms of these rights and obligations. Equal status is more important than equal income because citizenship conceptually alters existing patterns of social inequality13. For Marshall:

“The extension of the social services is not primarily a means of equalizing incomes. In some cases it may, in others it may not. The question is relatively unimportant…what matters is that there is a general enrichment of the concrete substance of civilized life, a general reduction of risk and insecurity, an equalization between the more and the less fortunate at all levels...equalization is not so much between classes as between individuals within a population which is now treated for this purpose as though it were one class14.”

In other words, it is about increasing people’s life chances15 and maintaining a decent standard of life. It starts becoming problematic when someone comes up and says that this improvement of equality is not actually a part of what it means to be a citizen. Instead, what determines the status of a citizen could be one who constantly seeks monetary gains for his own self. Furthermore, Marshall himself recognizes that there is no universal principle that can determine what the rights and duties of a citizen are16. In our health care example, what if its’ provision is based on something else other than taxation such as contributions? What if a citizen was not able to make such contributions because he was either unemployed or ill for a long period of time? It would seem that the rights to health care automatically disappears: no obligations therefore no rights17. This sounds a little too calculated and strips citizenship down to the bones and might no longer provide surety of welfare provision.

Eventually, with these in mind, citizenship itself becomes a highly contestable18 and malleable concept. How much benefits does citizenship guarantee? How is the active exercise of citizenship measured? How is status perceived? What is considered a decent way of living? These are just some of the questions the next section will attempt to discuss.

On Citizenship And Welfare Provision

Clearly then, whenever you see paupers in a State, somewhere in that neighbourhood there are hidden away thieves and cutpurses and robbers of temples, and all sorts of malefactors.

-Plato, The Republic: Book VIII

Linking citizenship and welfare provision is a normative proposal and a way of defending it, says King and Waldron (1988). Furthermore, they accept that social citizenship is embedded in people’s expectations and cannot be easily done away with19. In one way or another, every society tries to work out its own combination of citizenship and welfare provision. Different combinations mean different welfare regimes with differing emphasis on their provisions20. This is how the paper first proceeds with the discussion. It looks at the differing conceptions of citizenship of welfare regimes in relation to receiving welfare provisions.

For the purposes of comparison, Espring-Anderson’s (1990) three typologies of welfare states—liberal, conservative, and social-democratic21 along with Holliday’s (2000) productivist welfare state22. The discussion acknowledges that typologies may miss idiosyncratic events that might have led to the formation of a particular welfare regime along with its conception of citizenship entitlements. The alternative route uses a narrower approach. It will discuss how citizenship becomes a more arbitrary term within an already arbitrary sphere of citizenship and provision.

Citizenship: Who Gets What, Why, and How

In liberal welfare states, provisions have more to do with providing for low-income and usually working class state dependents than the population as a whole23. In this sense, citizenship does not automatically guarantee access and rights to welfare provision. Even if it does, a citizen must prove through means-testing that he is indeed qualified to receive welfare assistance. What is more, the state deals with welfare provision in a very hands-off approach turning to the market instead. The well-off and capable working citizens are thus directed to purchase welfare from private providers. Espring-Andersen lists the United States and Australia as examples.

For these countries, citizenship and equality are translated into equality to participate in the labour market and receive a living wage24. A living wage can be defined as the minimum amount that would allow a worker (usually a white male) to live as a human being in a civilized community and to keep himself and his family in frugal comfort25. Thus welfare benefits are neither universal nor earnings-related and definitely not a social right. The obligation then for the citizen is to be self-sufficient, work, and contribute to the economy. State intervention appears mostly in these areas. For example, the “Aid to Families with Dependent Children” (provides Medicaid, food stamps, and unemployment insurance) in the United States was revised by former President Clinton to have a two-year lifetime limit after which the recipient has to find employment or be offered publicly subsidized jobs26.

For conservative welfare states social rights are not really much of a contested issue, says Espring-Andersen27. He further explains that this can be traced to their corporatist-statist history where status and rights are preserved and attached to class and status28. Access to welfare provision is therefore guaranteed (usually) universally by citizenship through taxation or contributions’ related methods of obligation. Moreover, the state along with social partners carries out the provision. Espring-Andersen places Austria, France, and Italy under this typology. Unlike the liberal welfare state, welfare provision in the conservative typology is the birth right of a citizen. Equality rests on this notion of access but not necessarily of benefits. For example, the pension schemes are open to all citizens but the payout amount will depend on their income level.

As for the social-democratic model, universalism and social rights are overarching to all segments of society29. Citizenship guarantees both a right to welfare provision and equality to status. It is a system where the state actively pursues the highest standard of welfare and not a minimum-subsistence one. Espring-Andersen elaborates:

“Manual workers enjoy the rights identical to those of white-collared employees or civil servants…all benefit; all are dependent; and all will presumably feel obliged to pay30”.

As the benefits are flat-rate and the main obligation is to pay taxes, the social-democratic welfare states of Sweden and Denmark tackle the problem of status inequality that is problematic to the two previous welfare states. These inequalities take the form of gender as non-working females (who stay at home) are typically excluded. There is also poverty because welfare-seeking is often stigmatized in liberal states poor people choose not to have them. Then there is also inter-generational inequality where the pay-as-you-go systems of conservative states put the burden on the working population. While they might provide enough for the current dependents, their own security is not in their hands.

As for the productivist welfare states, the notion of citizenship and welfare provision branches out to three subcategories: facilitative, developmental-universalist, and developmental-particularist31 welfare states. Holliday came up with the typology to examine East Asian welfare that does not seem to perfectly fit Espring-Andersen’s typologies. He argues that social policy in East Asia, unlike in Europe is subordinated to economic policy (although this paper’s author is critical of that claim). Those contributing to the factors of production are the ones mostly given the benefits.

To begin with, the facilitative and developmental-particularist seem to converge with their conception of citizenship and welfare provision. Holliday identifies Hong Kong and Singapore for these typologies respectively. Both emphasize that their citizens must not expect any free handouts from the government32. Aside from turning to private providers, people must strive to be self-sufficient by working (very much like the liberal welfare state). Additionally, both Hong Kong and Singapore have provident funds that working citizens mandatorily contribute to and can be used for social insurance. Notice that what one puts it is what one will get—there is no redistribution.

However, for the unemployed or the aged who cannot contribute to the provident fund, citizenship does not really do anything much. They do receive minimum means-tested benefits but are usually very strict (more so in Singapore than in Hong Kong since the latter targets a wider number of old people). Interestingly, both Singapore and Hong Kong have massive and successful housing programs. While this may disguise a false universalism, it could be argued that it was an effective route to distribute their economic gains33.

Holliday identifies Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea as the developmental-universalist welfare states. The category partly gives it away. These states actively provide universal welfare provision to their citizens—South Korea and Taiwan’s National Health Insurance for example—but it must be noted that it took a lot of negotiation and change before citizenship guaranteed universal welfare. In any case, social rights are definitely more emphasized in these states than in the facilitative and developmental-particularist ones. Obligation of the citizen is usually in terms of (mixed) taxation and prior contributions. Benefits are however, selective and income-related.

Now, attention is briefly turned to a narrower and still more arbitrary conception of citizenship and welfare provision. Under all the welfare states discussed except the social-democratic model, generally seem to miss out women. Much of the earlier welfare provision programs were targeted at working men only. Even Marshall is criticized that his concept of social citizenship is only applicable to men; women are not defined as dependent but completely disappeared from the picture34. Women get the “second class” citizenship treatment. Kennett further argues:

“Women are incorporated as members of the family, a private sphere that is essential to, but separate to and opposite from the public sphere of civil society and the state which are male constructs…the white male worker represents the ‘individual’, ‘the citizen’ in the public sphere and is legitimized in the private sphere as a breadwinner35”.

The conservative and developmental welfare states put emphasis not only in taking care of one’s own self but also of the family stepping forwards. As is usually the case, women become the primary providers of care. Moreover, by excluding non-working females from social insurance and instead providing them with family benefits help encourage motherhood36. Things could not be any rosier for women under a liberal welfare system. Single and unemployed mothers are burdened with trying to source for work that can provide welfare provisions such as health for herself and dependents.

In all, discussing citizenship and welfare provision under the context of welfare regimes tells some important things: citizenship (or at least the perception of it) is an instrument that can be used to exclude or include certain segments of society from receiving welfare provision. Receiving is only a part of it, however. It also sets what is to be received—something to support minimum subsistence or something to support the highest standards of the quality of living. The benefits may also be distributed equally or according to certain status-linked considerations. Additionally, citizenship also involves how access in terms of obligations is to be met—as pure social rights or through a mechanized analogue such as employment or prior contributions.

Conclusion

This paper discussed the relationship between citizenship and welfare provision. It started by outlining the concept of citizenship. It was established that what citizenship means varies according to different eras in time. For example, following Marshall, the 18th, 19th, and 20th centuries where when civil, political, and social rights of citizenship successively were developed. It was also established that citizenship is bestowed as a status and a system of rights and obligations.

Moving forward, these factors were examined according to different welfare provision systems under the liberal, the conservative, the social-democratic, and the productivist welfare states. It appeared that each of these models perceive citizenship and welfare provision in differing ways. The social-democratic welfare state for example, recognizes the social rights of citizenship and thus welfare provision is universal. The reverse is true for say, the liberal welfare state where social rights of citizenship are equated to minimum provision in favour of labour opportunities. Gender inequality, specifically on women being “second class” citizens was also discussed.

To reiterate a previous point, citizenship can be used to include or exclude certain peoples from receiving welfare. However, in all cases except the Scandinavian model, it is often a necessary but not a sufficient condition whether one is entitled to receiving welfare. For example, one needs to be a working Singaporean citizen to be able to contribute and draw from the Central Provident Fund. It may well be that citizenship in relation to welfare provision is apolitical instead of being political because governments can either reduce or extend social rights through welfare policies. But these changes may also reflect the current socio-political ethos37. Additionally because of these changes that the welfare state must adapt to, so will the obligations and rights of citizenship have to38. For social policy, these are important considerations to bear in mind.

While this paper was not set out to question the morality embedded in citizenship such as it being reduced to a form of rational market exchange39, it would be a good topic to move into next but will probably have more to do with philosophy than public policy. A discussion on the implications of supra-national organizations such as the EU and OECD on citizenship and welfare provision would be more relevant. As well, immigration the naturalization issues would be interesting. For example, do immigrants choose to acquire citizenship of another country (assuming it is a welfare state) to exercise that citizenship or are they just after the welfare? It is a rather broad assumption, but it has important implications for immigration policies.

Bibliography

Espring-Andersen, Gosta (1990) Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. Cambridge: Polity.

Fitzpatrick, Tony (2003) After the New Social Democracy: Social Welfare for the Twenty-first Century. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Godin, Robert (2001) “Work and Welfare: Towards a Post-Productivist Welfare Regime” in British Journal of Political Science. Vol.31, No.1, pp.13-39. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Accessed via /stable/3593274 on 30 March 2008.

Hasenfeld, Yeheskel, Rafferty, Jane, & Zald, Meyer (1987) “The Welfare State, Citizenship and Bureaucratic Encounters” in Annual Review of Sociology. Vol.13, pp.387-415. Accessed via /stable/2083254 on 30 March 2008.

Holliday, Ian (2000) “Productivist Welfare Capitalism: Social Policy in East Asia” in Political Studies. Vol.48, No.4, pp.706-723.

Kenett, Patricia (2001) Comparative Social Policy. Buckingham: Open Press University.

King, Desmond & Waldron, Jeremy (1988) “Social Citizenship and the Defence of Welfare Provision” in British Journal of Political Science. Vol.18, No.4, pp.415-443. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Accessed via /stable/193879 on 30 April 2008.

King, Desmond & Waldron, Jeremy (1988) “Social Citizenship and the Defence of Welfare Provision” in British Journal of Political Science. Vol.18, No.4, pp.415-443. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Accessed via /stable/193879 on 30 April 2008.

Kwon, Huck-Ju (1998) “Democracy and the politics of social welfare: a comparative analysis of welfare systems in East Asia” in The East Asian Welfare Model: Welfare Orientalism and the State. Roger Goodman, Gordon White, and Huck-Ju Kwon (Eds.). London: Routledge.

Marshall, Thomas Humphrey (1950) Citizenship and Social Class. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Peterman, John (2000) Wadsworth Philosophers Series: On Plato. California: Wadsworth/Thomson Learning.

Powell, Martin & Hewitt, Martin (2002) Welfare State and Welfare Change. Buckingham: Open University Press.

Stewart, Angus (1995) “Two Conceptions of Citizenship” in The British Journal of Sociology. Vol.46, No.1, pp.63-78. London: London School of Economics and Political Science. Accessed via /stable/591623 on 30 March 2008.

1 Marshall, Thomas Humphrey (1950) Citizenship and Social Class. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

2 King, Desmond & Waldron, Jeremy (1988) “Social Citizenship and the Defence of Welfare Provision” in British Journal of Political Science. Vol.18, No.4, pp.415-443. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Accessed via /stable/193879 on 30 April 2008.

3 Powell, Martin & Hewitt, Martin (2002) Welfare State and Welfare Change. Buckingham: Open University Press.

4 Pierson (1998a) cited in Powell & Hewitt (2002:101).

5 Powell, Martin & Hewitt, Martin (2002) Welfare State and Welfare Change. Buckingham: Open University Press.

6 Ibid.

7 Peterman, John (2000) Wadsworth Philosophers Series: On Plato. California: Wadsworth/Thomson Learning.

8 Kenett, Patricia (2001) Comparative Social Policy. Buckingham: Open Press University.

9 Powell, Martin & Hewitt, Martin (2002) Welfare State and Welfare Change. Buckingham: Open University Press.

10 Ibid.

11 Ibid.

12 Fitzpatrick, Tony (2003) After the New Social Democracy: Social Welfare for the Twenty-first Century. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

13 King, Desmond & Waldron, Jeremy (1988) “Social Citizenship and the Defence of Welfare Provision” in British Journal of Political Science. Vol.18, No.4, pp.415-443. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Accessed via /stable/193879 on 30 April 2008.

14 Marshall, Thomas Humphrey (1950) Citizenship and Social Class. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

15 Marshall, Thomas Humphrey (1950) Citizenship and Social Class. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

16 Ibid.

17 Fitzpatrick, Tony (2003) After the New Social Democracy: Social Welfare for the Twenty-first Century. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

18 Stewart, Angus (1995) “Two Conceptions of Citizenship” in The British Journal of Sociology. Vol.46, No.1, pp.63-78. London: London School of Economics and Political Science. Accessed via /stable/591623 on 30 March 2008.

19 King, Desmond & Waldron, Jeremy (1988) “Social Citizenship and the Defence of Welfare Provision” in British Journal of Political Science. Vol.18, No.4, pp.415-443. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Accessed via /stable/193879 on 30 March 2008.

20 Godin, Robert (2001) “Work and Welfare: Towards a Post-Productivist Welfare Regime” in British Journal of Political Science. Vol.31, No.1, pp.13-39. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Accessed via /stable/3593274 on 30 March 2008.

21 Espring-Andersen, Gosta (1990) Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. Cambridge: Polity.

22 Holliday, Ian (2000) “Productivist Welfare Capitalism: Social Policy in East Asia” in Political Studies. Vol.48, No.4, pp.706-723.

23 Opscit.

24 Kenett, Patricia (2001) Comparative Social Policy. Buckingham: Open Press University.

25 Ibid.

26 Ibid.

27 Espring-Andersen, Gosta (1990) Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. Cambridge: Polity.

28 Ibid.

29 Espring-Andersen, Gosta (1990) Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. Cambridge: Polity.

30 Ibid.

31 Holliday, Ian (2000) “Productivist Welfare Capitalism: Social Policy in East Asia” in Political Studies. Vol.48, No.4, pp.706-723.

32 Kwon, Huck-Ju (1998) “Democracy and the politics of social welfare: a comparative analysis of welfare systems in East Asia” in The East Asian Welfare Model: Welfare Orientalism and the State. Roger Goodman, Gordon White, and Huck-Ju Kwon (Eds.). London: Routledge.

33 Powell, Martin & Hewitt, Martin (2002) Welfare State and Welfare Change. Buckingham: Open University Press.

34 Pedersen (1993) cited in Kennett (2001: 119).

35 Kenett, Patricia (2001) Comparative Social Policy. Buckingham: Open Press University.

36 Espring-Andersen, Gosta (1990) Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. Cambridge: Polity.

37 Powell, Martin & Hewitt, Martin (2002) Welfare State and Welfare Change. Buckingham: Open University Press.

38 Hasenfeld, Yeheskel, Rafferty, Jane, & Zald, Meyer (1987) “The Welfare State, Citizenship and Bureaucratic Encounters” in Annual Review of Sociology. Vol.13, pp.387-415. Accessed via /stable/2083254 on 30 March 2008.

39 Fitzpatrick, Tony (2003) After the New Social Democracy: Social Welfare for the Twenty-first Century. Manchester: Manchester University Press.