Some others, however, I still sometimes think about. One, "Mommy: Last Thoughts of an Aborted Person" has always come back to me. For the most part, this is due to the premise. The reason I deleted it originally is one that makes me still hesistate to put it back up: it doesn't communicate the exact premise particularly clearly. Also, it isn't an essay in the straightforward sense of the word.

Still, in spite of these reservations, I thought I would bring it back, mostly because the "flaws", as was usually the case in this point, were there on purpose. Almost half the reviewers, if I remember, did not grasp that the narrator of the story was not the one being aborted in the traditional sense of the word. ie, there had to be some level of obfuscation just to weed out the people that saw the word "abortion" and immediately allowed their brains to shut down.

This time, though, I thought I might explain here, clearly, the premise as I imagined it:

A regressive psychotic is about to be executed by the state. He is at least vaguely aware of the reasons he is incarcerated, even though he does not know that he is about to be executed. He knows that the reasons for his incarceration are formally due to his actions in assisting his mother in an abortion. They aborted the child because it was a result of incest between the mother and son--thus, the narrator was the father/brother of the unborn fetus when he aborted it. The incest that resulted in the fetus was, additionally, rape.

A basic chronolgy then:

1) Narrator rapes his mother.

2) Mother becomes pregnant.

3) Narrator aborts his mother's child, and his own brother/son. (The mother's consent to this action is not stipulated.)

4) State charges the narrator with abortion. (In this world, abortion is an executable offense)

5) State executes the narrator via electric chair.

The ethical implications of this rather simplistic scenario have sometimes caught me up.

The first game I wanted this piece to play (assuming people comprehended the scenario of the piece at least in part) was to see how well people could play the game of: Does the acceptance of "abortion" match the acceptance of "execution" and if not why? The title, "Last Thoughts of an Aborted Person" is supposed to be ironic in the sense that the narrator is not being aborted in the traditional sense of the word, but is instead being aborted post-birth via execution.

The second game is onlny for those people that actually support execution by the state. If one does support execution, are the charges here really the right charges? Is it the *abortion* that is the real executable offense here? That's what the state seems to have charged him with. However, should the mother really have been expected to carry a child that was the result of incestuous rape? Again, the first game comes into question here for some individuals.

I would end this with an amusing review from when I had this piece up originally, but unfortunately I'm too lazy to look through my records. So you end with no witty punchline to this forum post. Alas.

However, should the mother really have been expected to carry a child that was the result of incestuous rape?

I've never understood why circumstances like this should influence the morality of abortion one way or another. If abortion is wrong, it's as wrong to kill an unborn fetus who is a product of rape/incest as it is to kill a 5-year-old kid who is a product of rape/incest. If abortion isn't wrong, it's a moot question.

Which is "worse" - abortion or capital punishment?

I've never understood why circumstances like this should influence the morality of abortion one way or another. If abortion is wrong, it's as wrong to kill an unborn fetus who is a product of rape/incest as it is to kill a 5-year-old kid who is a product of rape/incest. If abortion isn't wrong, it's a moot question.

Some people include intentionality in their conception of whether abortion is wrong or not. ie, some people might only have a problem with abortion if they're "lazy" or "afraid." Some might feel that abortion is excuseable if it is "impossible to love the child;" also, not everyone equates an unborn fetus with a five year old child. Some might feel that life is not significant until it has developed a neural network and the capacity to feel pain.

It depends. Capital punishment as practiced in the United States is bad but nowhere near as bad as abortion. Capital punishment as it was practiced in, say, revolutionary France or Soviet Russia might be as bad as abortion.

Some people include intentionality in their conception of whether abortion is wrong or not. ie, some people might only have a problem with abortion if they're "lazy" or "afraid."

In that case their reason for opposing abortion, where they oppose it, is not grounded in respect for life. So equating abortion with capital punishment to make your point involves a kind of non sequitur.

Some might feel that abortion is excuseable if it is "impossible to love the child;"

For the most part, 'unloved' children seem to want pretty strongly to live. If they don't they can always kill themselves. More to the point, I don't see why someone who feels this way should have any particular objections to capital punishment for consistency's sake.

also, not everyone equates an unborn fetus with a five year old child. Some might feel that life is not significant until it has developed a neural network and the capacity to feel pain.

Right, but if there's nothing wrong with abortion, then questions of incest/rape/poverty/whatever are completely irrelevant.

What exactly is bad about abortion now, and what exactly was wrong with capital punishment during revolutionary war? Are you referring to the act itself or the means by which it is decided why it should be done?

1-MF: Some people include intentionality in their conception of whether abortion is wrong or not. ie, some people might only have a problem with abortion if they're "lazy" or "afraid."

2-NT: In that case their reason for opposing abortion, where they oppose it, is not grounded in respect for life. So equating abortion with capital punishment to make your point involves a kind of non sequitur.

3-MF-New: Including intentionality in moral conceptions does not negate the possibility for "respect for life" also being a major factor. Quite the contrary, believing that people who have abortions out of "laziness" are wrong is quite related to having objections to abortion due to their respect of life. It is hardly a non sequitur.

For the most part, 'unloved' children seem to want pretty strongly to live. If they don't they can always kill themselves. More to the point, I don't see why someone who feels this way should have any particular objections to capital punishment for consistency's sake.

Why on earth do you feel that "'unloved' children seem to want pretty strongly to live"? The many cases of children dying of neglect seem to be a strong counter-example to that claim. The "If they don't they can always kill themselves" argument is rather obtuse. If you don't feel that someone who feels this way should have any particular objections to capital punishment, what if they nonetheless did have objections to capital punishment?

Right, but if there's nothing wrong with abortion, then questions of incest/rape/poverty/whatever are completely irrelevant.

The belief that life is not significant unless it has developed a neural network does not mean that that belief entails "there's nothing wrong with abortion." It means that some might have objection to aboring fetuses during certain periods, but have no (or much less of an objection) at other periods.

Abortion is wrong because it kills people who aren't murderers. Capital pinishment as practiced for the French revolution also killed a lot of people who weren't murderers, though the ratio of murderers to not-murderers was probably significantly higher than with abortion.

1-MF: Some people include intentionality in their conception of whether abortion is wrong or not. ie, some people might only have a problem with abortion if they're "lazy" or "afraid."

2-NT: In that case their reason for opposing abortion, where they oppose it, is not grounded in respect for life. So equating abortion with capital punishment to make your point involves a kind of non sequitur.

3-MF-New: Including intentionality in moral conceptions does not negate the possibility for "respect for life" also being a major factor. Quite the contrary, believing that people who have abortions out of "laziness" are wrong is quite related to having objections to abortion due to their respect of life. It is hardly a non sequitur.

If aborting a fetus out of 'laziness' is okay but doing it for... whatever other reason, social hygiene or whatever is okay, then respect for life, whatever role it plays, is a pretty low consideration. If they consider abortion taking life and yet permit it for such reasons, why should they object to capital punishment or even murder? Maybe they should just oppose killing people lazily or something. And if they don't consider abortion taking life, whether they oppose it kina/sorta for other reasons or not, why should their view on the matter inform their view of capital punishment at all?

Why on earth do you feel that "'unloved' children seem to want pretty strongly to live"?

The only way there is of knowing such things: looking for revealed preferences in action.

The many cases of children dying of neglect seem to be a strong counter-example to that claim.

The many people who lose or mangle their limbs in accidents is a good argument for amputating people's arms and legs when they're still babies and are less aware of pain. Actually this is essentially the argument of many advocactes for circumcision...

The "If they don't they can always kill themselves" argument is rather obtuse.

Perhaps it is, it is nevertheless correct.

If you don't feel that someone who feels this way should have any particular objections to capital punishment, what if they nonetheless did have objections to capital punishment?

I don't see why your essay should have anything to say to them. Likely whatever their views on capital punishment, they rest on other grounds that your essay doesn't address. But *on the grounds of their views on abortion*, why should they feel one way or another about capital punishment?

The belief that life is not significant unless it has developed a neural network does not mean that that belief entails "there's nothing wrong with abortion." It means that some might have objection to aboring fetuses during certain periods, but have no (or much less of an objection) at other periods.

I don't see what this distinction has to do with the issue you're trying to raise. If the person is more or less okay with aborting a fetus at a very early stage because they don't consider it life, then what should that have to say to their feelings on capital punishment? I would think you'd only be concerned with their objections to abortions they *do* see as the taking of life. In that case, why should they feel differently about the abortions they do see as taking life and the killing of five-year-olds? Is it okay to kill five-year-olds who are products of rape? Ones that are unloved? Likely they will say 'no'.

If the person is more or less okay with aborting a fetus at a very early stage because they don't consider it life, then what should that have to say to their feelings on capital punishment?

is precisely one of the underlying questions I've been trying to ask. Implicit in the piece is that there is something analogus in the arguments involving abortion and capital punishment.

The connection is in differing conceptions of life, and can be largely comprehended in the questions:

What is life?

When does life begin?

When does life end?

In what circumstances does life have meaning?

Under what circumstances is it acceptable, encourageable, or forgiveable for life to be terminated?

Finding an "objective" definition of the answers to those questions seems largely irrelevant if different people hold such vastly different conceptions of the answers to these questions. One researcher I've read claimed that the answers to these questions are often shaped by family, and the conception of family, but I find that a bit reductionist for my tastes.

For instance, I find it interesting that you find abortion to be wrong because it kills "people who aren't murderers". What exactly is it about someone being a "murderer" that makes them worthy of execution?

Is it linked to the amount of "threat" done in the crime they've committed? Or is it because the capacity for rehabilitation seems so small? Or is it because they themselves have indicated a small value for life?

The piece was only trying to raise issues as so far as it was seeking to give insight into the systemic differences between people.

They've wronged someone in a way that can't be repaid, at least not until we figure out how to bring people back to life (if ever). It's not so much that I feel they deserve to die. I probably should say that my feelings about capital punishment aren't very firmly set. On most days I tend to treat it like I treat torture: in theory it can be unequivically used for good, but such circumstances are so rare in the real world, that we should not allow it to be done.

That's certainly a fact of torture that decisively informs any moral deliberation on the subject. TK and I had a long debate a while back on the merits of holding the death penalty over people's heads to get them to confess to lesser charges. I see this as a dangerous moral hazard for the same reason I see torture as such. If this is what the death penalty is to be used for, I'd rather we not even have it as an option, even for the very worst.

Your conception "repayment" for criminal courts and morality is interesting--so crime and punishment is like "trade"?

I guess you could call it trade. Really it's just a restitution theory of justice. An aggressor is fair game until he makes restitution to his victim(s); a murderer can't possibly do this. He can pay off their friends and family and maybe they should have the first claim on him, but ultimately they're not the ones he wronged. If we ever figure out a way to bring people back from the dead (and not just do something lame, like make a clone) this problem will be solved.

Capital punishment is requested out of passion. Abortion is done out of good sense. Therefore, abortion = okay, capital punishment = stupid.

Game Theory states that the best short-term outcome is borne from a tit-for-tat strategy. Hamas kills a member of your parliament, you kill off one of their officers. This doesn't hold for the long term, but the game theory argument is enough to invalidate your point.

Costs too much from whose perspective? Anyway, abortion could easily be made more costly, and capital punishment could easily be made less so. Furthermore, you are a renewable resource (many people reach your age each year), therefore killing you would be sensible and good.

Capital punishment is requested out of passion. Abortion is done out of good sense. Therefore, abortion = okay, capital punishment = stupid.

Capital punishment is not always requested out of passion, abortion often is, the term 'good sense' begs the question, 'x is motivated by passion, therefore x is stupid' and 'x is decided upon coldly, therefore x is good' are both non sequiturs.

Okay, seriously now, I really do miss them and their righteous rantings.