Being(s) and nothingness Brian Hough

The very question of a definition of nothingness is problematic to begin with. Nothingess as a term resists itself for as soon we say nothingness 'is' we have missed the point and gone past nothingess into being. Nothingness is not nothingness, that is, the term 'nothingness' does not describe or establish nothingness but only points to it. In Derridean terms we could say that it is neither a term nor a concept if we intend to mean by things something that refers to a thing or contains some authority. Nothingness is neither and absence in the world nor a lack, for as Sartre points out, this lack is something, is in the world. Our efforts will be only to point to it.

We have been informed however that Nothingness brings beings into being, or makes being become beings. Nothingness, in its turning away and retreating brings the one into many. It is a groundlessness, but it itself is not. How then will we find it? I suggest through a quick investigation of the following term 'Being(s)'. The brackets around the 's' in this term signify a constant transition between Being or beings, that is, the term designates either being or beings, and possibly both, because of the brackets. Nothing can be pointed to (and it can 'be' pointed to, for its is not being as such except in the mode of being-pointed-to, the only of being which 'it' might 'posess') in the play that these brackets around the 's' cause. Nothingness can only be pointed to in the transition between being and being and vice versa. What various Kyoto school philosophers have sought to remind the west is that Being and beings can only be pointed to as behind nothingness. The brackets around the 's' are as prominent in being(s) as the actual phonetic sign itself the 'beings'. In no way though do the brackets signify anything stable or authoratative, they only initiate the play, the play which is not only between being and beings, but is being and beings.